Reforming the Equal Access to Justice Act by Baier, Lowell E.
Journal of Legislation
Volume 38 | Issue 1 Article 1
1-1-2012
Reforming the Equal Access to Justice Act
Lowell E. Baier
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Baier, Lowell E. (2012) "Reforming the Equal Access to Justice Act," Journal of Legislation: Vol. 38: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol38/iss1/1
REFORMING THE EQUAL ACCESS
TO JUSTICE ACT
Lowell E. Baier*
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which allows the recovery of
attorneys' fees from the federal government when the government's actions or
omissions were not substantially justified, is one of the broadest and widest-
reaching federal statutes on the books. This article examines the history and
ideological roots of EAJA, focusing on its legislative purpose as a measure that
protects individual citizens and small businesses. In exploring EAJA's mechanisms,
itfocuses on problems that have emerged with EAJA in recent years, particularly in
environmental litigation. It discusses how environmental groups and other non-
profits engage in abusive procedural litigation, receive excessive attorneys'fees in
cases totally disconnected from EAJA's original purpose, and force the government
into settlements at great expense. The article then considers reforms, situating the
proposed Government Litigation Savings Act of 2011 (GLSA) in the context of past
successful and attempted reforms to EAJA.
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INTRODUCTION
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) is one of the broadest-reaching, yet
most obscure federal laws in existence. Its basic function is simple: in any case, be
it in court or in an administrative agency proceeding, where the federal
government's position is not substantially justified, a prevailing party is entitled to
receive attorneys' fees, provided that there is no other applicable fee-shifting
statute. It is a safety net, designed to make sure that a party cannot be harassed by
unjustifiable government activity solely because of the prohibitive expense of
attorneys' fees, and it was originally passed to protect the small business
community from governmental overreach, just as earlier fee-shifting statutes were
designed to promote specific causes such as civil rights litigation.
In the past thirty years, this law has gone from a welcome corrective measure
for the small business community to a powerful weapon wielded against federal
agencies that has caused them to spend millions of dollars in payments for largely
meritless lawsuits, and an almost certainly larger amount of money in preparing for,
responding to, and fighting such lawsuits. And it has produced an incalculable
waste of taxpayer money and loss of government productivity.
This article explains how EAJA got to its current state, takes a hard look at the
abuses proliferating in the EAJA system, and examines reform measures that have
been proposed, both in previous Congresses and the current Congress.
Part 1 explains how EAJA came into being. The aim is to not only show a
unified and comprehensible congressional intent in passing EAJA, but also to show
that this intent was the culmination of a historical process which makes clear the
intent underlying EAJA, and why it is different from other fee-shifting statutes in
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federal law.
Part 2 then provides an explanation of the evolution of EAJA up to the present.
Both parts of the EAJA mechanism (embedded in 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. §
2412) are laid out, with explanations of the amendments introduced by Congress in
later years, and important court cases interpreting EAJA.
Part 3 discusses the problems with the EAJA system. Though this Part
discusses individual aspects separately, it cannot be over-emphasized that they form
a system or constellation of problems, each of which contributes to the damage
caused by the others. Among these problems are: (1) the routine evasion of the
statutory cap on attorneys' fees in a large number of cases; (2) the abusive litigation
engaged in by massive 501(c)(3) organizations not subject to the caps; (3) the Jean
incentive for the government to settle costs disputes, as well as the related ability to
turn losing cases into fee-award cases by artful settlement; and (4) perhaps most
important of all, the burgeoning costs of the unreformed EAJA system.
Part 4 then examines the proposals to reform EAJA made from 1981 to the
present. The article concludes by supporting the pending Government Litigation
Savings Act of 2011, though with the caveat that stronger measures are likely
necessary to fully correct EAJA.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE & THE EQUAL ACCESS TO
JUSTICE ACT: EVOLUTION AND REFORM
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) is a law with unusually deep roots in
several historical periods. The deepest, and perhaps most obvious, root of EAJA is
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),I the act which centralized the procedures
and law of administrative agencies.2 The APA was a bill of rights for individuals
and groups dealing with administrative agencies,3 and among other things EAJA
expands the rights it created; indeed, it is codified in part as an amendment to the
APA. 4 But describing EAJA as just an outgrowth or reform of the APA obscures
much of the story. It would likely not have been seen as necessary absent the steady
expansion of the administrative state and the entitlement programs of the 1950's
and 1960's; moreover, though similar in form and emphasis (as a fee-shifting
statute) to similar laws passed in the 1970's, instead of emphasizing public goods
and mechanisms for public participation, it instead emphasizes protection from
regulation. EAJA owes as much to the burgeoning wave of anti-regulatory thinking
that was gaining prominence in the late 1970's but is more commonly associated
with the ascendance of President Ronald Reagan and de-regulation in the 1980's.
1. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1947), (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. § 500).
2. See generally George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996); Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act:
The Beginnings, 72 VA. L. REV. 219 (1986).
3. Shepherd, supra note 2, at 1558; see also DONALD D. BARRY & HOWARD R. WHITCOMB, THE
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (3d. ed. 2005).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 504.
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This Part examines these historical periods in order to show the hybrid
conceptual nature of EAJA. Section A begins with the development of the
administrative state, and emphasizes the APA, both as a conceptualization of the
appropriate role of the administrative agencies, and as an attempt to provide
protections from over-regulation or agency overreach (a repeating theme that would
return in force in EAJA's enactment).
Section B discusses the expansion of the administrative state beyond its already
substantial state when the APA was passed. It also emphasizes the growth of
"entitlement" thinking: of legal, political, and moral arguments about rights to
various benefits from the government.
Section C looks at the increased concern with civil rights, environmentalism,
and other areas of what is now commonly called "public interest" law, as well as
the increasing deployment of fee-shifting legislation and its rapid spread across the
U.S. code after the Alyeska decision. Section C concludes by examining the debate
surrounding EAJA before its enactment; this section emphasizes differences
between the original version of the bill which aimed at public participation in
regulation-and the enacted version-which stressed public protection from
regulation. This section leads into the discussion of the enactment of EAJA itself in
Part 2, Section A.
A. The Beginning of the Modern Administrative State
When Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) became America's thirty-second President
in 1933, the Great Depression was nearing bottom, following the 1929 stock market
crash. The economy was in collapse, and the nation in despair.6 The prior decade
had seen the heights of the laissez-faire approach to governance, an approach in
which government's role was limited to a policing role to ensure public health and
industrial safety, and a facilitating role to private enterprise to promote production
and output.7 The approach relied on market forces to fulfill supply and demand and
ensure economic prosperity; the sovereignty of the market was very much
assumed.8 FDR's approach was an open rejection of the laissez-faire philosophy of
the prior decade. He believed comprehensive intervention and agency regulation by
the federal government was essential to achieve economic rehabilitation and
equilibrium in the economy. 9 The "New Deal" Administration first promised, and
then institutionalized, social and economic security for all citizens, but in return
created a reliance and dependency on and control by the federal government
characterized by many as a sharp departure from America's foundational character
5. See generally ANTHONY BADGER, THE NEW DEAL (2002); FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY (2006); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
AND THE NEW DEAL (2009); THE READER'S COMPANION To AMERICAN HISTORY 783-86, 957-58 (Eric Foner
& John A. Garraty, eds., 1991) [hereinafter Foner & Garraty].
6. See FREIDEL, supra note 5; MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, AMERICA'S GREAT DEPRESSION (1963).
7. E.g., Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1191-
92 (1985).
8. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 3-85.
9. See Rabin, supra note 7, at 1248.
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of enterprise, individualism, and self-reliance. 10
Through the newly created Works Projects Administration (WPA) (funded with
$5 billion), Roosevelt immediately created an abundance of public works projects
to provide jobs for the twenty-five percent of the country unemployed. A national
minimum wage and child labor law to protect against exploitation were added in
1938, reinforcing a standard eight hour day, forty hour workweek.12 The
centerpiece of FDR's economic recovery program was the National Industrial
Recovery Act, 13 followed by the Agricultural Adjustment Act which provided farm
subsidy payments,14 the Tennessee Valley Authority to address regional poverty
and destitution,' 5 and the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), employing 2.5
million young men improving America's national parks and forests with trails,
roads, and structures.16 Likewise, the Social Security Administration was created in
1935 and provided old age pensions for people sixty-five and older. The old age
insurance system was expanded in 1939 to provide survivors insurance for widows
and orphans.18 Later amendments greatly broadened this coverage, indexed them
against inflation via cost-of-living adjustments (COLA),1 9 and added disability
benefits for those unable to work. 20 The 1935 Social Security Act also created the
Federal-State Unemployment Compensation Program.2 ' "The public came to look
upon government as its guarantor against acute economic deprivation,"22 and
FDR's many social and economic programs as entitlements. 23
Beyond directly trying to provide jobs and federal aid, the New Deal also
dramatically expanded the federal government's administrative operations to
manage all of the social and economic recovery programs launched in the 1930's.
Eleven federal agencies were created in the time period prior to the Civil War.24
From 1865 to 1933, twenty-two more were added, bringing the total to thirty-
10. This issue is too multifaceted to be explored in depth here. For a discussion of Social Security as a
departure from individualism, see id at 1250.
11. Id. at 1249.
12. Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
13. Rabin, supra note 7, at 1243.
14. See id. at 1247.
15. See PAUL CONKIN, FDR AND THE ORIGIN OF THE WELFARE STATE (1967).
16. Rabin, supra note 7, at 1250 n.181.
17. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). In its earliest incarnation,
Social Security was an insurance program, with benefits "keyed to contributions during the working life of a
recipient." Rabin, supra note 7, at 1250. Of course, the program soon grew. For the most complete synopsis
and analysis of the 1935 Social Security Act and all subsequent amendments, see GARY SIDOR, CONG.
RESEARCH SERv., RL30920, MAJOR DECISIONS IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE ON SOCIAL SECURITY: 1935-2009
(2010).
18. Social Security Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 202, 53 Stat. 1360, 1364-1365 (1939).
19. Act of July 1, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-336, § 202, 86 Stat. 406,412-417 (1972).
20. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 441 (1980).
21. Social Security Act §§ 301-303, 86 Stat. at 626-627.
22. Rabin, supra note 7, at 1253.
23. See generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986); JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1981).
24. COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S.
Doc. NO. 8, at 7-11 (1941).
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three. 25 During the New Deal, seventeen new agencies were created, an increase of
more than fifty percent.26 Among the most notable New Deal agencies were the
Civil Aeronautics Board (now the Federal Aviation Administration), National
Labor Relations Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal
Communications Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission, and Social
Security Administration, each widely recognizable by its acronym.
Congress became concerned about the expanding powers that federal agencies
possessed in the administrative regulation of private conduct, rights, and
obligations,27 which Harvard Law School Dean and legal scholar Roscoe Pound
termed "administrative absolutism." 28 Roosevelt himself said these agencies with
the authority to execute legislative, judicial, and executive powers "threaten[] to
develop a fourth branch of government for which there is no sanction in the
Constitution."29 The lynchpin justifying expansive federal intervention in all
aspects of American life was the country's economic collapse and the free market's
failure to rebound. The New Deal strategy relied on the expertise of these new
federal agencies working collaboratively with industry to develop effective
solutions to eliminate economic uncertainty and disruption created by the laissez-
faire system. The judiciary, though at first reactive, eventually exercised restraint
and deference in shaping agencies' regulatory policy, and so provided the agencies
vast discretionary authority. 30 To challenge an agency's action, standing and the
right to sue required the assertion of a formal legal right, explicitly created by
statute, or a common law right, in those "aggrieved or whose interests are adversely
affected ... and then only to protect [a] public interest rather than narrow pursuit of
the petitioner's economic interest." 31
Increasing resentment of the agencies' latitude in matters affecting the rights of
private citizens attracted political attention. In the mid 1930's, FDR directed studies
of administrative methodology and conduct within the agencies.32 In 1939 he
ordered the Attorney General to investigate the administrative law process and
procedures of the federal agencies and recommend improvements. 33 The AG's
analysis and Final Report were completed in 1941,34 but were overshadowed by
America's entry into World War II.35
These concerns were set aside until the war ended in 1945. In 1946, after seeing
the results of the AG's Final Report as well as a reportedly painstaking and detailed
25. Id.
26. Id
27. Shepherd, supra note 2, at 1641-42. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 1980 (1946).
28. Rabin, supra note 7, at 1264.
29. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message from the President of the United States (Jan. 12, 1937), in THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, at iii-v (1937).
30. See Rabin, supra note 7, at 1271.
31. Id. at 1269.
32. Shepherd, supra note 2, at 1584-85.
33. See Rabin, supra note 7, at 1265 & n.243.
34. S. Doc. No. 8.
35. Shepherd, supra note 2, at 1641-42.
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ten-year study that it conducted itself,36 Congress enacted the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) to promote "accessibility, accountability, and fairness in
governance" and "legal and consistent procedures for both fairness to the public and
for administrative reasons of consistency, accountability, and efficiency." 37 One
Senator characterized it as "a bill of rights for hundreds of thousands of Americans
whose affairs are controlled or regulated" by federal agencies.38
The APA's articulated framework for regulating agencies and insuring due
process is as follows: (1) to require agencies to keep the public informed of their
procedures and rules; (2) to afford the public participation in the rulemaking
process; (3) to establish uniform standards for the conduct of formal rulemaking
and adjudication; and (4) to define the scope of judicial review. 39
The APA defines and organizes administrative agency action in two parts:
adjudication and rulemaking. Adjudication of past and present rights and liabilities
requires a trial-like hearing and a final decision with a written record of the
proceedings subject to judicial review.40 Rulemaking is a legislative action
regulating the future conduct of people by rules and regulations established through
hearings, public notice in the Federal Register, and a comment period. 4 1 It too is
subject to judicial review.42 The APA did not provide for a waiver of the sovereign
immunity of the United States; while an agency action could be contested
administratively at the agency level, citizens could not then challenge agency
actions in federal court unless specifically provided for in the underlying statute
giving rise to the dispute. 43 Moreover, no provision was made in the APA for a
statutory exception to the American Rule,44 and so private parties had to bear their
own costs and legal fees for agency adjudication. To reverse an agency action, one
had to prove the action was "arbitrary and capricious" and not supported by
substantial evidence. 45 While the substantial evidence test had theoretically been
the norm before the APA, the Supreme Court famously proclaimed Congress's
dissatisfaction with the state of administrative regulation before the APA and the
courts' application of the substantial evidence test in Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB: "It is fair to say that in all this Congress expressed a mood," while on the
one hand "the sponsors of the legislation indicated that they were reaffirming the
36. H.R.REP.NO. 1980, at 11-16.
37. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LAW 110 (Julia Beckett & Heidi 0. Koenig, eds., 2005).
38. BARRY& WHITCOMB, supra note 3.
39. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947), available at
http://www.law.fsu.edu/ibrary/admin/1947cover.html.
40. Administrative Procedure Act § 5, 60 Stat. at 239-40.
41. Id. at § 4, 60 Stat. at 238-39.
42. Id. at § 10, 60 Stat. at 243-44.
43. Id. In 1976, Congress explicitly provided a waiver of sovereign immunity for all APA cases. Act of
Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (197 6 ).
44. The American Rule states that attorneys' fees are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of
statutory authorization. E.g. Alyeska Pipeline Svc. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 240 (1975)
(applying the rule to federal cases); see also HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-970, AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES BY FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES 1-2 (2009).
45. 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(a) (2006); Rabin, supra note 7, at 1265.
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prevailing 'substantial evidence test' . . . with equal clarity they expressed
disapproval of the manner in which the courts were applying their own
standards." 46
Despite the attempt to "tame potentially unruly [agency] administrators," 47 and
some success on the part of the APA, substantial discretionary authority continued
to be the norm.48 As the Court put it in SEC v. Chenery: "Our duty is at an end
when it becomes evident that the [agency's] action is based upon substantial
evidence and is consistent with the authority granted by Congress." 49 Concerns
lingered that agencies developed "close informal relationships with constituency
groups," amalgamating public and private decision makers relatively free from
judicial interference. 50
B. The Expansion of the Administrative State
World War II put all of America to work in a unified effort to win the war and
preserve Western democracy, and so the resulting period (perhaps excepting the
Korean War (1950-53)) was one of major economic expansion, prosperity, and
peace. The successive presidential administrations of Harry Truman following
FDR's death in 1945, and especially the two terms of Dwight D. Eisenhower,
reinforced a sense of civil security with a deep respect and trust in the federal
government as the continually expanding New Deal entitlement programs of the
1930's, managed by a diversity of federal agencies, provided a safety net for the
middle class and the elderly, disabled and poor.52
The Eisenhower administration also expanded entitlement programs, including
public assistance (Supplemental Security Income) for the needy such as the blind,
the handicapped, the disabled, the elderly poor, and single parents with dependent
children, later expanded to poor two-parent families with children.5 3 Public housing
and rent supplements, food stamps and school lunch programs followed, as did the
necessary expansion of federal agencies to manage the expanded entitlement
programs.54 President Eisenhower continued to deploy the peace dividend-the
continued expansion of the American economy after the kick-start of World War
46. 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
47. Rabin, supra note 7, at 1271.
48. Id
49. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947).
50. Rabin, supra note 7, at 1271.
51. See generally KATZ, supra note 23; STEPHEN A. MAROLIN & JULIET B. SCHOR, THE GOLDEN AGE
OF CAPITALISM: REINTERPRETING THE POSTWAR EXPERIENCE (1992); PATTERSON, supra note 23; Michael
Dahlen, The Rise of American Big Government: A Brief History of How We Got Here, THE OBJECTIVE
STANDARD, Fall 2009.
52. See generally KATZ, supra note 23; MARGLIN & SCHOR, supra note 51; PATTERSON, supra note 23;
Dahlen, supra note 51.
53. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-713, 1381-83 (2006).
54. See National School Lunch Act, Pub. L. No. 79-396, 60 Stat. 230 (1946); Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program, 7 U.S.C. § 2013 (2006); GAIL RADFORD, MODERN HOUSING FOR AMERICA: POLICY
STRUGGLES IN THE NEW DEAL ERA (1996); LAWRENCE J. VALE, FROM PURITANS TO THE PROJECTS: PUBLIC
HOUSING AND PUBLIC NEIGHBORS (2000).
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II-with the development of other major public works such as the interstate
highway system.55 All of this led to a massive, albeit relatively gradual, expansion
of federal agency authority.
The expansion of administration also made litigation against the United States
more frequent and more commonplace. Prior to 1956, judgments against the United
States were sporadic enough that Congress still dealt with them by specific
congressional appropriations.56 In 1956, Congress enacted the Judgment Fund, a
permanent, indefinite, open-ended appropriation without fiscal year limitations (in
this manner paralleling the appropriations for entitlement legislation) for the
payment of final judgments against the United States which were not otherwise
provided for.5 7 In 1961, Congress amended the Judgment Fund statute to allow
payments from the fund by the Department of Justice for the settlement of actual or
imminent litigation.58
The civil rights movement gained national attention in 1954 with the U.S.
Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, desegregating
public schools in Topeka, Kansas. 59 It expanded through the efforts of Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr.'s non-violent desegregation efforts in the 1950's and 1960's, and
the militancy of other groups such as the Nation of Islam and Malcolm X. 60 This
unrest set in part the stage for the expansion of a new era of social programs with
the election of President John F. Kennedy followed by President Lyndon Johnson.
President Kennedy wanted to revitalize socially and economically deprived
communities using federal agency outreach, and began taking some steps in that
direction.61 Following Kennedy's assassination, President Johnson's War on
Poverty was built around the same concept.62 Johnson first came to Washington in
1937 as a New Deal loyalist, and as President (1963-69) he was outspokenly
resolved to broaden and expand FDR's "New Deal" by creating the "Great
Society."63 Where FDR's justifications for massive government intervention were
the economic distress, unemployment, uncertainty, and dislocation caused by the
Great Depression, Johnson's justifications for expanded federal government
intervention were racial discrimination, social disenfranchisement, and regional
55. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374 (1956). See generally STEPHEN
AMBROSE, EISENHOWER: SOLDIER AND PRESIDENT (1990).
56. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-978SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS
LAW 14-2 to -8 (2008).
57. This appropriation is located at 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1956).
58. Act ofAug. 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-187, 75 Stat. 415-16 (1961) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2414 (2006)).
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60. See generally STOKELY CARMICHAEL WITH EKWUEME MICHAEL THELWELL, READY FOR
REVOLUTION (2003); MALCOLM X: THE MAN AND HIS TIMES (John Henrik Clarke ed.,1969); ROBERT
wEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1990).
61. See Rabin, supra note 7, at 1272.
62. Id.
63. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER (1982); Foner &
Garraty, supra note 5, at 600-01; Editorial, The Road to a Downgrade, A Short History of the Entitlement
State, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2011 [hereinafter The Road to a Downgrade].
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poverty. 64 Johnson's expansions of the administrative state were to prove among
the most consequential: social reforms included federal education aid, a liberal
immigration law, major civil rights legislation (most notably the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965), Medicaid, subsidizing healthcare for the
poor, and Medicare for all others over 65.65
The Great Society, like the New Deal, brought dramatic expansion of federal
agencies to the expanding social reform and entitlement programs in health,
housing, education, and public welfare. These mandatory contributory social
insurance programs account for sixty-six percent of the national budget today, not
including veterans' medical programs, or military and federal civilian retirement
programs and pensions.66
Johnson's War on Poverty was also codified in the Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964 (EOA) which prescribed "maximum feasible participation" among the poor
and disenfranchised.67 Neighborhood service centers staffed by federal employees
were established throughout the country as the institutional mechanism to deliver
federal programs addressing physical and mental health, housing, urban renewal,
education, family planning, manpower training, legal aid, juvenile delinquency, and
related welfare programs. 68 From these community-based centers arose a reform
movement of organized group efforts led by community leaders and organizers who
resorted to militant tactics like demonstrations, marches, and sit-ins to embarrass
state and municipal welfare administrators into action, energizing local programs
under the rubric of the "maximum feasible participation" ordained by the 1964
EOA. 69
The National Welfare Rights Organization led the reform movement
throughout the 1960's on the thesis that "welfare should be recognized as a right,
not a privilege, and a guaranteed minimum income should be assured to every
family by the federal government.,70 Some thinkers conceptualized various
entitlements as something akin to property rights, 7 1 while others conceptualized
them as expanded due process rights. 72
The erosion of political support and the continuing political counter-emphasis
on the ethos of individualism and self-reliance eventually led to the dismantling of
many of the Great Society's welfare programs following Johnson's departure in
1969.73 But the legacy of maximizing local and individual participation in federal
agency proceedings set a precedent for the future of regulatory agency response and
reform during major economic, political and societal turmoil affecting broad public
64. Rabin, supra note 7, at 1272-73, 1275, 1279.
65. Id at 1272-78; see also CARO, supra note 63.
66.- The Road to a Downgrade, supra note 63.
67. Rabin, supra note 7, at 1273.
68. Id.
69. See id; ALLEN J. MATUsow, THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA (1984); Foner & Garraty, supra note 5,
at 471 .
70. Rabin, supra note 7, at 1277 (emphasis added).
71. See, e.g., Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 773 (1964).
72. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
73. See Rabin, supra note 7, at 1278 n.298.
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interests for two decades thereafter.
C. The Era ofPublic Interest Law: Civil Rights, Consumerism, and
Environmentalism
At roughly the same time, trust in the federal government began to wane. The
assassination of Dr. King in 1968 and the ensuing race riots, which destroyed many
inner cities, divided and polarized the country.74 America was at war in Southeast
Asia, and many questioned the commitment made in Washington to militarily
democratize South Vietnam, a failed exploit which ended fifteen years later in a
humiliating loss at a cost of 58,220 Americans killed, 153,303 wounded, 1,687
missing in action and $111 billion. 75 America's involvement provoked angry,
militant anti-war protests spanning almost two decades, and a bitterness and distrust
of government that survives yet today in generations of veterans, and those who lost
family members and friends.76
In the early 1970's, distrust of government only grew, as a series of crises
underlined the failings of government. From the Watergate scandal77 to the
skyrocketing price of oil,78 there was cause for unease. Matters worsened when the
Yom Kippur War caused the 1973-1974 oil embargo, and with shortages
compounded by Richard Nixon's earlier price controls on domestic oil, 79 rationing
became widespread. The OPEC cartel steadily raised oil prices, which reached
over $80 a barrel during the second major energy crisis in 1979. The response to
the oil crises included significant regulatory growth. A national maximum speed
74. See generally WEISBROT, supra note 60.
75. STEPHEN DAGGETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22926, COSTS OF MAJOR U.S. WARS 2 (2010);
ANNE LELAND & MARI-JANA OBOROCEANU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32492, AMERICAN WAR AND
MILITARY OPERATIONS CASUALTIES: LISTS AND STATISTICS 11 (2010); DEFENSE PRISONER OF
wAR/MISSING PERSONNEL OFFICE, VIETNAM-ERA STATISTICAL REPORT: AMERICANS UNACCOUNTED FOR
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (June 1, 2011), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/vietnam/statistics/20 1/documents/Stats20110602.pdf.
76. Rabin, supra note 7, at 1281.
77. Watergate Retrospective: The Decline and Fall, TIME, Aug. 19, 1974, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,942983,00.html. See generally CARL BERNSTEIN AND
BOB WOODWARD, THE FINAL DAYS (1976).
78. The initial rise in the price of oil from its stability in the late 1960's was largely caused by U.S.
government action, as President Richard Nixon abandoned the gold standard and ended the Bretton Woods
Accord, destabilizing international financial markets. See generally DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC
QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER (1991); David Hammes & Douglas Wills, Black Gold: The End ofthe
Bretton Woods and the Oil-Price Shocks in the 1970's, 9 INDEP. REV. 501 (2005).
79. See DAVID FRUM, How WE GOT HERE: THE 70's: THE DECADE THAT BROUGHT YOU MODERN
LIFE-FOR BETTER OR WORSE (2000); RITCHIE OVENDALE, THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS
(2004); YERGIN, supra note 78; Roy Licklider, The Power ofOil: The Arab Oil Weapon and the Netherlands,
the UnitedKingdom, Canada, Japan, and the United States, 32 INT'L STUD. Q. 205, 209 (1988).
80. In fact, gasoline rationing coupons like those used during World War II were printed but never
distributed. FRUM, supra note 79; Gas Fever: Happiness is a Full Tank, TIME, Feb. 18, 1974; Rationing
Coupons Shredded, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1984; Rationing: Spotty Local Starts, TIME, Feb. 25, 1974.




limit of 55 MPH was imposed by the Emergency Highway Energy Conservation
Act.82 Development of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve began in 1975,83 and
in 1977 the cabinet-level Department of Energy was created, 84 followed by the
National Energy Act of 1978. 8
The mood of the times was such that the leadership and wisdom of both
,,86political and business leaders were "no longer taken for granted. Over the same
two decades, a steady drumbeat of consumer products complaints and
environmental disasters was driving regulatory growth. Ralph Nader and his
followers attacked the consumer products industry, beginning with the auto
industry, which he vilified in his 1965 book Unsafe at Any Speed. These efforts and
similar ones led to a host of federal consumer product safety laws to protect the
consumer. The Auto Safety Act of 1966 was a direct response to Nader's
persistence, followed by the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967, the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, the FTC Improvements Act that restructured the Federal Trade
Commission, and the creation of the Consumer Products Safety Commission in
1972.87
Environmental disasters in the 1960's and 1970's further eroded the public's
trust of the federal government and gave rise to an important new movement -
environmentalism. The hazards of atomic fallout had become a public concern due
to worries about nuclear war, and that continued throughout this period.88 Rachel
Carson published Silent Spring in 1962, alerting America to the danger of
uncontrolled pesticides like DDT which were killing the environment, thereby
igniting the beginning of the environmental movement to protect man and nature. 89
Lake Erie was declared "dead," contaminated by the uncontrolled dumping of
heavy metals, phosphorus and other man-made industrial pollutants. 90 The Santa
82. Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-239, 87 Stat. 1046 (1974).
83. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, §§ 151-166, 89 Stat. 871, 881-90
(1977).
84. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1980).
85. The National Energy Act of 1978 is the collective name for the following statutes: Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1980); Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1980); National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat.
3206 (1980); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (1980);
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1980).
86. Rabin, supra note 7, at 1281-82.
87. Id. at 1283-84. "A number of consumer protection laws followed the 1966 Motor Vehicle Safety
Act. Some of the most significant legislation of this period ... included the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act of 1966, the Child Protection Act of 1966, the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966, the
Wholesome Poultry Products Act of 1967, the Flammable Fabrics Act of 1967, the Natural Gas Pipeline
Safety Act of 1968, the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, the Radiation Control Act of 1968,
the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, the Child Protection and Safety Toy Act of 1969, the Fire
Research and Safety Act of 1969, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970."Id. at 1284 n.317.
88. See Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Testing at Nevada Test Site 1950-60: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services and Education, and Related Agencies, S. Comm. on
Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997); Study: 1950's Nuclear Fallout Worse than Thought, CNN, Mar. 1, 2002,
available at http://articles.cnn.com/2002-03-01/us/nuclear.fallout_1_nuclear-tests-fallout-hot-spots?.
89. See Rabin, supra note 7, at 1282.
90. NOEL M. Bums, ERIE: THE LAKE THAT SURVIVED 111-24 (1985). See generally WILLIAM
MCGUCKEN, LAKE ERIE REHABILITATED: CONTROLLING CULTURAL EUTROPHICATION 1960s-1990s (2000).
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Barbara oil spill in 1969 despoiled California beaches. 91 The Cuyahoga River in
Cleveland caught fire in 1969, the 10th time since 1868, bringing national attention
to its environmental pollution from industrial wastes being dumped in it for over a
century. 92 Continuous smog alerts in Los Angeles were identified as causing
widespread respiratory illnesses.93 Public awareness of acid rain developed in the
1970's following a series of New York Times articles on earlier scientific reports of
the environmental damage acid rain was causing in the Northeast. 94
In 1978, the Love Canal located in Niagara Falls, NY, became the "national
symbol of [our government's] failure to exercise a sense of concern for future
generations." 95 Twenty-one thousand tons of toxic waste had been negligently
disposed of in the canal by the Hooker Chemical Company, contaminating the
adjacent thirty-six block neighborhood and leading to the relocation of 800 families
and reimbursement for their homes and lots.96 And finally, the Three Mile Island
nuclear disaster in 1979 capped two decades of increasing awareness of
environmental disasters and further deepened America's lack of trust in the federal
government, with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission cited for lack of
performance, control and response to the disaster. 97
It became apparent the existing laws and regulations to protect and insure the
public's safety and health and the environment had not been adequate. Economists,
in particular George Stigler, were developing theories explaining why regulatory
agencies were subject to 'capture'-a phenomenon where, by virtue of concerted
effort on the part of the regulated industries, regulatory agencies would begin to
regulate from the perspective of those industries instead of in the public interest.98
There was a ground swell of support for scrutiny of the federal government's
actions and demands for massive enactment of consumer protection and
environmental laws and regulations in the 1960's-70's. 99
The public's interest in these new laws and regulations exposed numerous
91. Rabin, supra note 7, at 1282.
92. See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental
Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89, 90, 101-03 (2002).
93. Rabin, supra note 7, at 1282.
94. See JOHN A. HANNIGAN, ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY: A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE
130-32 (1995).
95. Sam Howe Verhovek, After 10 Years, the Trauma of Love Canal Continues, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
2008, at BI (quoting Commissioner David Axelrod, New York State Health Department).
96. See CRAIG E. COLTEN & PETER N. SKINNER, THE ROAD TO LOVE CANAL (1996); LOIS MARIE
GIBBS, LOVE CANAL: AND THE BIRTH OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH MOVEMENT (2010); ALLAN MAZUR,
A HAZARDOUS INQUIRY (1998).
97. Thomas R. Wellock, Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective, 67 HISTORIAN
507, 547-48 (2005) (book review).
98. See, e.g., George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SC. 3,
3-18 (1971).
99. The new environmental laws included the following: Clean Air Act (1963, substantially amended
1970); The Wilderness Act (1964); Water Quality Control Act (1965); Clean Water Restoration Act (of
1966); Endangered Species Preservation Act (ESA) (1966, substantially amended 1969 and 1973); The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (1970); Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (1971);
Marine Mammal Protection Act (1972); National Forest Management Act (1976); Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (1976); and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1976).
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structural weaknesses in federal regulatory agencies, stemming largely from the
latter's confusion over the interrelationship between their dual functions as
advocates for and judges of the public interest. The public demanded the
protections afforded by these new laws, and the right to privately enforce them if
the federal agencies failed to do so, and so hold the government and big business
accountable for their actions or omissions. 100
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)o10  was an important
component of this regulatory reform, since it forced federal agencies to assess and
afford substantial preference to intangible aesthetic, environmental and
conservation values, and fully explain their decisions and actions as they related to
public interests.102 NEPA went a substantial step farther than the APA had in
making it clear that federal agencies did not have a blank check of discretionary
authority - at least not when statutorily enumerated values were in play.103
Judicial recognition of the rise of environmental consciousness and the birth of
public interest environmental law can be attributed to three major cases: Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, I04 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, os and Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.106 In Scenic Hudson, the
court ordered the FPC to account for preservation of all forms of natural life (i.e.
conservation); assess intangible aesthetics, scenic beauty, natural heritage, and
historic values in decision -making; and permit third party intervenors to contribute
materially to the proceedings.107 Overton Park established that these intrinsic,
intangible values are of extraordinary magnitude and are to be treated as paramount
in agency decisions.los The Hill case established the primacy of wildlife and
species conservation over economic considerations.1 09
These developments helped shape a national perspective that led to the
broadening of the waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity in certain
instances, notably the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Endangered Species
Act, empowering the public to initiate private citizen suit litigation against both the
federal government and big business. This was enhanced further by Congress
legislatively permitting the recovery of attorneys' fees, making a host of statutory
exceptions to the American Rule. 110 The 1970s clearly became the era of public
interest representation, and it's not surprising that the two leading environmental
100. See infra notes 117-123 and accompanying text.
101. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
102. Id §§ 4332-33. NEPA's "distinctive" system of Environmental Impact Statements were far
reaching, in contrast with the rest of the Act's largely aspirational language. See Rabin, supra note 7, at 1284-
85.
103. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 4331.
104. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
105. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
106. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
107. 354 F.2d at 624-25. This case has been described as marking the birth of the environmental
movement "more than any other single judicial decision." Rabin, supra note 7, at 1297-98.
108. 401 U.S. at 412-13.
109. 437 U.S. at 194.
110. See COHEN, supra note 44; Henry Cohen, Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against the United States: The
Sovereign is Still Somewhat Immune, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 177 (1979).
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public interest law firms were established in that period: the Natural Resources
Defense Council in 1970 as a byproduct of the Scenic Hudson case,II and in 1971
the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, called Earthjustice after 1997.112
When the Clean Air Act (1963), 13 Clean Water Act (1965)114 and the
Endangered Species Act (1966)115 were initially enacted, none provided for a
waiver of sovereign immunity, authorized private citizen suits, or authorized the
recovery of attorneys' fees. To enforce each, a citizen had to establish a related
violation of the APA. However, the APA did not authorize the recovery of
attorneys' fees. Provoked by continuing environmental disasters, and looking to the
example of civil rights legislation which did provide for private citizen suits and the
recovery of attorneys' fees, each of these three statutes were amended in 1970,
1972 and 1973, respectively. 116
The first citizen-suit provision in an environmental statute to waive sovereign
immunity and provide fee shifting was the 1970 amendment to the Clean Air
Act.117 The amendment granted standing to private citizens to enforce the Act by
bringing suit against violators, and alternatively to protect themselves from an
overzealous EPA (which enforced the Clean Air Act) by likewise bringing suit
against the EPA.118 For this reason, the citizen suit provision is also known as a
"private attorney general" provision.11 9 The 1970 amendment further provided for
the reimbursement of attorneys' fees and litigation costs to any party whenever a
court deemed it appropriate, whether from the federal government or private
defendants. 120
The Clean Water Act was likewise amended in 1972 to provide for private
citizen suits, thereby waiving the federal government's sovereign immunity.121 The
1973 Endangered Species Act amendment did the same.122 Like the Clean Air Act,
both the Clean Water Act and Endangered Species Act amendments also provided
for the shifting of litigation costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees and expert
witness fees, for the benefit of the prevailing or substantially prevailing party. 123
The appropriated source of money for such reimbursement by the federal
government was the Judgment Fund, administered by the Department of Justice
111. Rabin, supra note 7, at 1298.
112. Earthjustice, OUR HISTORY, http://earthjustice.org/about/our-history (last visited Aug. 14, 2011).
113. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
114. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965). The 1965 Act was itself an
amendment to the Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1949).
115. Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966).
116. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972); Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
117. Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 304, 84 Stat. at 1706-07.
118. Id.
119. COHEN, supra note 44, at 5.
120. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 304(d), 84 Stat. at 1706.
121. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 505, 86 Stat. at 888-89.
122. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 11(g), 87 Stat. at 900-01.
123. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 1 I(g)(4), 87 Stat. at 901; Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 § 505(d), 86 Stat. at 889.
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totally free of oversight or accountability.124
However, other than the Clean Air, Clean Water, and Endangered Species Acts,
none of the other consumer protection or environmental statutes enacted in the
1960s and 1970s provided for either private citizen suits, or the fee shifting to
reimburse them for attorneys' fees and litigation costs. The only other statutory
vehicle a private citizen had to challenge the federal government's agency action
was the APA, but again, that had no provision for recovering attorneys' fees.
The prime regulatory agencies of immediate concern to private citizens and
especially small business owners were both created in 1970: the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), headed by William D. Ruckelshaus, and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration agency (OSHA), headed by George
Guenther.125 In addition to the public outcry these two new agencies caused by
their enforcement methods, the Internal Revenue Service, Social Security
Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Labor were next
on the public's radar for overzealous and arbitrary enforcement or lack of
compliance with the laws and regulations they were charged to administer.126 But
the explosion of lawsuits over enforcement of many of the new environmental
statutes had yet to occur.
Running parallel to the enactment of the many new environmental statutes and
regulations during this time period was a lawsuit begun in 1970 that ultimately
made its way before the U.S. Supreme Court as Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society.127 On May 12, 1975, the Court ruled that federal agencies and
courts did not have the authority to award attorneys' fees and litigation costs to any
party acting as a private attorney general in the absence of express statutory
authority.128 The Supreme Court's Alyeska decision struck like dynamite, and
immediately prompted Congress to, amongst other responses, enact the Civil Rights
124. See Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 11(g)(4), 87 Stat. at 901; Water Pollution Control
Amendments of 1972 § 505(d), 86 Stat. at 889; Clean Air Act of 1970 § 304(d), 84 Stat. at 1706; see also
discussion supra p. 9.
125. Chronology of EPA Administrators, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (June 13, 2011),
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/admin/agency/index.html; Occupational Safety & Health
Administration, Former Assistant Secretaries (1971-2009), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/formersecretaries.html (last visited Sep. 16, 2011).
126. See generally Judicial Access/Court Costs: Hearings on H.R. 5103 & 6429 Before the Subcomm. on
SBA and SBIC Authority & General Small Business Problems of the H. Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong.
(1980) [hereinafter Judicial Access/Court Costs]; Equal Access to Courts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery ofthe S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1978) [hereinafter Equal
Access to Courts]; Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: Hearings on H.R. 3361 and Related Bills
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong. (1977) [hereinafter Public Participation in Agency Proceedings]; Public Participation in Federal
Agency Proceedings Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 270 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1977) [hereinafter Public Participation in Federal Agency
Proceedings Act of 1977]; Public Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings, S. 2715: Hearing on S. 2715
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1976)
[hereinafter Public Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings, S. 2715].
127. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
128. Id. at 269.
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Attorneys' Fee Awards Act of 1976,129 since civil rights was an area in which the
award of attorneys' fees had traditionally been regarded as appropriate. 130 Related
bills followed.
Among these bills were broad proposals by the Department of Justice and by
Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA). The Department of Justice proposed a bill to
automatically pay attorneys' fees in any federal litigation to a prevailing party.' 3 1
Senator Kennedy also wanted to create a generic law to cover fees in a wide variety
of cases to underwrite the actions of private attorney generals acting in the public
interest, and avoid a Senate filibuster every time a fee shifting provision was added
to proposed legislation.132 Public interest groups, including the ACLU, testified
before Congress that the Alyeska decision "struck a sharp blow at the public interest
bar by cutting off its most promising economic base."1 33 Others saw Alyeska as a
"trend towards making legal recourse less accessible to ordinary citizens." 1 34
The ferment created by Alyeska led to the precursors of EAJA. However, the
first such proposals were very much in the environmentalist or public-interest
mode. Eight days following the Supreme Court's Alyeska decision, S. 2530, a bill to
provide equal access to the courts when suing the federal government, was
introduced on October 20, 1975 on the floor of the U.S. Senate by Senator James L.
Buckley (D-NY) as public interest legislation.135 It was assigned to the Senate
Judiciary Committee for consideration, where it remained.136
Shortly thereafter, however, on November 20, 1975, Senator Edward Kennedy
introduced Senate bill 2715, the "Public Participation in Government Proceedings
Act of 1976," which proposed to amend the APA.137 The intent of this bill was to
improve the public's perception of their relationship with the federal government,
make government more responsive and responsible to private citizens, and increase
public participation in federal agency proceedings.138 Concerned that the costs of
hiring attorneys and expert witnesses barred most Americans from participating in
government agency proceedings, the bill initially proposed providing funding for
legal fees in advance for private citizens or public interest organizations to hire
attorneys.1 39 Senator Buckley suggested also including criminal defendants with
129. 42 U.S.C. §1988(b).
130. See S. REP.NO.94-1011 (1976).
131. S. REP. No.95-737 (1978).
132. See generally Public Participation in Agency Proceedings, supra note 126, at 32-39; Public
Participation in Government Proceedings Act of 1976: Hearing on S. 2715 Before the S. Comm. on
Government Operations, 94th Cong. 12-13 (1976) [hereinafler Public Participation in Government
Proceedings Act of 1976].
133. Causes ofPopular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJustice: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 67 (1976).
134. Id. at 121.
135. Bill Summary & Status, 94th Congress (1975-1976), S.2530, All Information, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d094:S.2530:@@@L (last visited Jan. 12,
2012).
136. Id.
137. Public Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings, S. 2715, supra note 126.
138. See generally Public Participation in Government Proceedings Act of 1976, supra note 132.




The criteria for advance funding required (1) a high likelihood the agency could
provide the petitioner the relief sought in substantial measure; (2) that the agency
proceeding served an important public purpose; (3) that the petitioner represented
an interest which could reasonably have been expected to contribute substantially to
a fair determination of the proceeding, and provide a fair balance of interests; (4)
that the economic interest of the person or organization was small in comparison to
the cost of effective participation in the proceeding; and (5) that the petitioner did
not have sufficient resources to participate effectively in the absence of an advance
payment for attorneys' fees. 141 In this early proposal, $10 million per year for an
experimental three-year period was to be appropriated and a central, independent
disbursing agent designated to coordinate attorneys' fee awards.142 This made
perfect sense for a Congress that was struggling to re-examine the nature and scope
of the agencies' administrative processes in the light of public pressure embodied
by the host of new environmental and public-interest statutes of the 1970s.
If agencies were generally incapable of regulating in the public interest without
considering the viewpoints of all the segments of the public included in the
regulatory process (a judgment already embedded in the APA),14 3 the next logical
step was to reimburse citizens for participating in the agency process and thereby
improving it. Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm (D-NY) encouraged an
"affirmative action approach" in the legislation to bring in those who had been
"locked out of the decision making process by virtue of their income, their race,
their economic scale or their educational limitations."1 44
Senator Edward Kennedy described the intent of the legislation as
"encouraging participation by groups, whether they are women, minorities, the
elderly, consumers, environmentalists, or other different elements in our society,
whose interests have not been represented before the various agency decisions in
the past." 45 Presciently, one witness in a Senate hearing characterized the scope of
the pending legislation as follows:
When we talk about reimbursing citizen organizations, everybody seems to
think we are talking about paying the Sierra Club or the Environmental Defense
Fund. And I know it is not the intent of your bill to do that. You are talking about
paying any citizen organization which can contribute to the proceedings .... You
are not just talking about financing the public interest bar or financing so-called
environmental groups. You are talking about giving citizens of all stripes the ability
to come in and test their notions and have their points of view heard.146
863, at 23 (1976).
140. Public Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings, S. 2715, supra note 126, at 75.
141. Id. at 149.
142. Id. at 70; S. REP. No. 94-863, at 45 (1976).
143. See Public Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings, S. 2715, supra note 126.
144. Id at 78.
145. Public Participation in Government Proceedings Act of 1976, supra note 132, at 13 (testimony of
Senator Edward M. Kennedy).
146. Public Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings, S. 2715, supra note 126, at 53. (testimony of
Tersh Boasberg).
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This early concept of funding attorneys' fees in advance to serve private
citizens and broad public interest groups was discredited as setting a dangerous
precedent that would raid the Treasury by incentivizing special interest groups to
litigate for their own sake and to further their own interests, as well as encouraging
parties to bring insubstantial claims.147 Regulatory agencies were already
backlogged and overburdened, and broader citizen participation would only delay
proceedings.148 It was further argued that the legislation would encourage the
participation of those with the least financial interest in the outcome, but failed to
cover those who were most affected.149 One public interest law firm testified that
narrow interest groups such as the Sierra Club would dominate, and it would be
more burdensome for regulatory agencies to determine what was in the public
interest if constantly faced with special interest concerns. 150 The same witness also
raised concerns about the possibility of collusion between agency staff and special
interests groups if the groups were further rewarded by receiving fee award
compensation from the same agency.151
After President Jimmy Carter took office on January 20, 1977, Congress began
to intensify their efforts to redefine and narrow the scope of EAJA. The American
economy was rapidly spiraling downward with another major recession looming
and interest rates rising to historic levels. Both small and large business enterprises
were in crisis, with unemployment high at 7.5 percent, and small businesses, in
particular, were struggling to survive and meet payroll.152 This brought a new
urgency to enacting EAJA, which was redefined to meet the needs of average
citizens and small businessmen for attorneys to protect their businesses and their
rights from being damaged by what Senator Pete Domenici characterized as a
"bureaucratic blitzkrieg" waged in Washington on America's businesses. 153 The
enforcement of new regulations created by EPA and OSHA became drivers that
sparked the outrage of small business.154 Moreover, expanding enforcement and
147. Public Participation in Government Proceedings Act of 1976, supra note 132, at 24 (testimony of
Joseph C. Swidler).
148. See S. REP. No. 94-863, at 8 (1976) (testimony of Ben Blackburn).
149. See Public Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings Act of 1977, supra note 126, at 103.
150. See Public Participation in Government Proceedings Act of 1976, supra note 132, at 60 (testimony
of John T. C. Low, Southeastern Legal Foundation).
151. See id at 60-61.
152. See FRUM, supra note 79. President Carter's own words best portray the despair of the nation over
the 1979 oil shock crisis:
It is a crisis of confidence . .. a crisis that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will ....
We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of
purpose for our Nation. . . . The erosion of our confidence in the future is threatening to destroy the social and
the political fabric of America .. .. Our people are losing .. . faith, not only in government itself but in the
ability as citizens to serve as the ultimate rulers and shapers of our democracy .... Looking for a way out of
this crisis, our people have turned to the Federal Government and found it isolated from the mainstream of our
nation's life. Washington, D.C., has become an island.
President Jimmy Carter, Speech, Crisis of Confidence (July 15, 1979), available at
http://www.cartercenter.org/news/editorialsspeeches/crisis-of confidence.html.
153. See 123 CONG. REC. 39,116 (1977).
154. See Judicial Access/Court Costs, supra note 126; Equal Access to Courts, supra note 126; Public
Participation in FederalAgency Proceedings Act of 1977, supra note 126.
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new regulations in other agencies, such as the National Labor Relations Board,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Federal Trade Commission, and the
Department of Labor were causing American businesses enormous costs they could
not afford. 155
In this atmosphere, the tide began to turn against regulation. Unrest in Iran
caused a second oil crisis in 1978,156 and the U.S. prime rate for borrowing money
immediately jumped to ten percent, before increasing steadily to its historic high of
21.5% by December 1980.157 This led to an asset/liability crisis throughout the
savings and loan industry causing massive failures to occur.1s The regulatory
systems in place provided inadequate protection against this crisis, and the Carter
administration began a phased deregulation of oil price controls in April, 1979.159 It
was the beginning of the era of deregulation.160
As the deregulation movement began to coalesce, the initial wholesale public
interest approach to EAJA of providing advance funding for all groups to
participate rapidly lost favor, and instead Congress turned to the pressing need to
enable private citizens and small businesses to challenge regulatory agencies. The
central principle remained that if a party prevailed against the government, it would
be eligible to recoup attorneys' fees.
Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) introduced the revised legislation on the Senate
floor during the 95th Congress on December 15, 1977 (S. 2354), with Senator
Gaylord Nelson (D-WI) making the following statements in support: "In case after
case, a federal bureaucratic blitzkrieg has rolled over innocent victims, causing
unjustified damage to large numbers of business enterprises and individuals."l61 He
continued, "The need for this legislation highlights a basic dilemma which the U.S.
faces along with the other industrial democracies. Can we have a powerful national
government to enforce the laws which protect public health and safety and preserve
competition in the marketplace, while avoiding a government which is so powerful,
intrusive and arbitrary that it poses a menace to individual and economic
freedom?" 62
155. See generally Equal Access to Courts, supra note 126; Public Participation in Federal Agency
Proceedings, S. 2715, supra note 126.
156. See YERGIN, supra note 78, at 785; Another Crisis for the Shah: A Grim Week ofStrikes, Slowdowns
and Lingering Discontent, TIME, Nov. 13, 1978, at 44.
157. Prime Interest Rate History, FEDPRIMERATE.COM, http://www.wsjprimerate.us/
wall_street joumal prime rate-history.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2011).
158. Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis, 13 FDIC BANKING REV.
26, 27 (2000); Ramon P. DeGennaro & James B. Thompson, Capital Forbearance and Thrifts: An Ex Post
Examination ofRegulatory Gambling, FED. RES. BANK OF CHI. PROC. 406, 406 (May 1993).
159. President Jimmy Carter, Energy Address to the Nation (Apr. 5, 1979), in [1989] 1 PUB. PAPERS
609-14 (1980).
160. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 4 (1982); ROBERT E. LITAN & WILLIAM D.
NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 1 (1983); Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal
Through The New Presidentialism, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227, 230 (1998); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2247 (2001).
161. 123 CONG. REC. 39,117 (1977).
162. Id. at 39,119.
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II. THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
As detailed above, by the late 1970's Congress's general focus had shifted to
the protection of small business and individuals from the reach of an overzealous
regulatory state. With that goal set, the development of the new EAJA legislation
proceeded swiftly. This Part focuses on EAJA itself. Section A discusses the
passage of and subsequent amendments to EAJA, while Section B explores the
many changes and controversies that EAJA, like any legislation, has been subjected
to over the years. Section C concludes by providing a primer on how EAJA
applications currently work. This Part highlights several provisions which while
historically uncontroversial, have played an extremely significant role in recent
developments.
A. The Passage ofEAJA
As it ultimately passed, EAJA served two purposes. First, it continued the trend
of waiving sovereign immunity to place the United States on equal footing with
other litigants. Since 1966, 28 U.S.C. 2412 had provided for the recovery of court
costs from the United States.163 EAJA built upon this by providing that the United
States could be held liable for another party's attorneys' fees "to the same extent
that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of
any statute which specifically provides for such an award."l64 But EAJA did much
more than this, also creating a completely novel structure whereby the United States
could be held liable for attorneys' fees in situations where no private party ever had
been under the American Rule. This was intended to protect citizens and businesses
from the long, sometimes arbitrary arm of government regulation.
Thus, when Senator Domenici reintroduced the EAJA legislation in the 96th
Congress (S. 265) on January 31, 1979, he described the bill as necessary because
"[i]ndividuals and small businesses are in far too many cases forced to knuckle
under to regulations . . . because they cannot afford the adjudication process."1 65
Original co-sponsor Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) echoed Senator Domenici's
remarks: "Through the device of fee shifting, this legislation will improve our
citizens' access to courts and administrative proceedings. It will encourage them to
vindicate their rights and not to acquiesce in a ruling or sanction which they believe
arbitrary, misguided or unfair." 166 Senator DeConcini further commented on the
importance of taking fee awards from the budgets of offending agencies as a
"quantitative measure of whether an agency is engaging in excessive unreasonable
regulation."l67 S. 265 was reported out and recommended to the Senate by the
Judiciary Committee on July 20, 1979, and passed the Senate on July 31, 1979 by a
vote of ninety-four to three. The counterpart House bill H.R. 2846 was introduced
163. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-507, § 1, 80 Stat. 308, 308 (1966).
164. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§ 204(a), 94 Stat. 2321, 2328 (1980).
165. 125 CONG. REC. 1437 (1979).




on September 6, 1979 by Representative Morris Udall (D-AZ), and a similar bill,
H.R. 6429, was introduced on February 5, 1980 by Representative Joseph McDade
(R-PA). Significantly, the House bills provided as an essential element that to
qualify to collect attorneys' fees and litigation costs for challenging an agency
decision, a party had to have a direct and personal interest in the action of the
government, have suffered an injury, or have a likelihood of suffering irreparable
harm. 168
Initial projections of EAJA's cost were high: the Department of Justice
estimated that the legislation could cost the government as much as $250 million
per year.169 The Congressional Budget Office projected a lower cost of $108
million in 1980, and $137 million by 1982.170
The House and Senate had been moving in tandem throughout the 95th and
96th Congresses considering substantively similar versions of the same EAJA bill.
As the House and Senate moved towards consensus and closure on EAJA in the
spring and summer of 1980, and with the 96th Congress attempting to rapidly
adjourn ahead of the presidential election, House bill H.R. 6429, titled the Small
Business Equal Access to Justice Act, was reported out of the Committee on Small
Business on May 16, 1980. On June 10, 1980, it was incorporated as Title II in a
much larger small business bill (H.R. 5612), and passed in the House on a roll call
vote of 367 to 33, with 33 members not voting. On September 19, 1980, the Senate
Select Committee on Small Business sent H.R. 5612 to the Senate for approval. On
September 26th, the House Judiciary Committee approved and referred to the
House for approval the Senate's version of EAJA, S. 265, accepting the Senate bill
as written notwithstanding the House's slightly different approved version of
EAJA. On the same day, September 26th, the Senate incorporated S. 265 into H.R.
5612 and passed the bill by simple voice vote.
Because the House and Senate versions of the bill were not identical in their
wording and differed on several concepts, they were submitted to a Congressional
Conference Committee for reconciliation. The joint Conference Committee of the
House and Senate met, and their report was filed with the House and Senate on
September 30, 1980. The next day, October 1, 1980, both the House and Senate
approved the final version of the bill and sent it to the White House for President
Carter's signature. On October 21, 1980, H.R. 5612 became Public Law 96-481.
President Carter issued this statement:
[The] legislation provides small businesses with "equal access to justice" -
another high priority of the White House Conference on Small Business. Many
small businesses have learned from bitter experience that when an unfair action is
brought against it by a Government agency it may be cheaper and easier to pay a
fine than to fight for vindication. This new law will change that .... Some of the
168. H.R. REP. No. 96-1005, pt. 1, at 9 (1980). This is significant because the requirement was
subsequently dropped. See discussion infra p. 29.
169. E.g., The Awarding ofAttorneys' Fees in Federal Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, & the Admin. ofJustice ofthe H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 89 (1978) [hereinafter
The Awarding ofAttorneys'Fees in Federal Courts].
170. S. REP. No. 96-253, at 10(1979).
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proposals previously advanced were too broad in their application and too
expensive, but this legislation strikes a fair balance between the Government's
obligation to enforce the law and the need to encourage business people with
limited resources to resist unreasonable Government conduct. 171
Since EAJA was characterized as an "experimental bill" by the Congress with a
three year sunset (September 30, 1984), Congress kept a careful eye on the Act
through five congressional hearings and five committee reports between the date of
EAJA's enactment on October 1, 1980, and the date of its permanent reenactment
on July 24, 1985.
One of Congress' primary concerns about EAJA had been its potential costs.
While in 1979 the Congressional Budget Office had projected that EAJA would
cost over $100 million during the experimental three-year period,172 in 1985, it
produced new projections putting the annual cost at $3 million in 1986, growing to
$7 million by 1990.173 The following table of costs lists the actual costs and number
of EAJA applications, including both agency and court cases that occurred during
fiscal years 1982-1984, as reported by the Administrative Conference of the United
States and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts:174
Fiscal Year Total Apps. # Granted Total EAJA Avg. Award
1982 133 13 $676,692 $52,053
1983 121 60 $1,727,556 $28,793
1984 423 170 $1,370,240 $8,060
Given the early utilization of EAJA, several specific issues of concern
materialized. Congress particularly sought to clarify the meaning of certain key
statutory phrases, including "position of the United States," "substantially
justified," and "prevailing party," and to adjust the definition of "party" to make it
consistent in both agency adjudications and court proceedings, which the 1980
statute failed to do. These developments, and others, are more thoroughly addressed
in Section B of this Part. 7 5
After 1980, EAJA was established law, but it was just beginning its journey to
its present form. Because the original bill contained a sunset provision effective
September 30, 1984, it was necessary for the legislation to be permanently
reauthorized. Congress first did so on October 11, 1984, in a bill that was ultimately
vetoed by President Ronald Reagan.176 President Reagan did not disapprove of
EAJA itself, instead insisting on a series of technical changes desired by the
171. Presidential Statement on Signing H.R. 5612 into Law, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCs. 2381
(October 21, 1980).
172. See discussion supra note 170.
173. H.R. REP.NO. 99-120, pt. 2, at 2 (1985).
174. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE REPORTS, infra note 232; ADMIN. OFFICE REPORTS, infra note 232.
175. See infra Part 2.B.
176. Memorandum of Disapproval of H.R. 5479, 20 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 1814, 1814 (Nov. 8,
1984) (Re: Equal Access to Justice Act Amendments).
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Department of Justice. 177 Notably, in a Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies issued alongside the veto, Reagan directed agencies to
"accept and retain on file any applications for awards of fees and expenses ...
and. .. continue to provide . .. appropriate assistance in making such
applications . . . as if the Act were in force . . . such claims shall then be reviewed
by the agency in accordance with the terms of the reauthorized Act .. . particularly
to small businesses . . . ." This directive reinforced the fact that EAJA's purpose
was to enable private citizens and small business to defend themselves from
overzealous regulatory agencies. After some changes were made,179 on August 8,
1985, Reagan finally signed a new, permanent Equal Access to Justice Act.180
This bill was also explicitly tied to small business, with Rep. Robert
Kastenmeier (D-WI) explaining that "[tihe main purpose of the legislation is to
ensure access to justice for individuals and small businesses and organizations who
are involved in civil disputes with the Federal Government."181 Senator Domenici,
again the Senate champion of the bill, echoed his House colleague on the purpose
of EAJA:
[T]he essential concept of the Equal Access to Justice Act is that when a
small business or individual citizen prevails in litigation with the Federal
Government, that was initiated by the Federal Government, then that
individual or business entity should be reimbursed for his or her attorney's
fees and costs if the government's position was not substantially
justified . .. [w]e must eliminate the possibility of . .. Pyrrhic
victories . . . . Equal justice is not available when one cannot afford to
fight. 182
Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AK) elaborated: "We believe that if a small business
successfully challenges the Federal bureaucracy ... [it] should be able to recover
[its] costs." 183 The reenactment of EAJA, however, did not occur without
opposition. One agency in particular, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
complained about the administrative burden EAJA had placed on the agency,
certainly a prescience for the more significant burden it would place on the
Departments of Agriculture and Interior two decades later: "[T]he act has had a
negative impact on the agency's mission, in the sense that it has necessitated an
expenditure of resources that could otherwise have been utilized in handling NLRB
177. Id. at 1815. DOJ was concerned that absent an explicit statutory statement otherwise, EAJA
litigation could be used as an excuse to open the record and essentially re-litigate the merits of the case. See
infra pp. 26-27.
178. Memorandum from the President, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 1815, 1815 (Nov. 8, 1984) (Re:
Equal Access to Justice Act).
179. Specifically, inter alia, provisions responding to DOJ's concerns. See infra pp. 26-27.
180. Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183.
181. 131 CONG. REC. 16,916 (1985).
182. Id. at 20,354. A host of business and professional associations as well as government agencies
supported EAJA's permanent reenactment. Id. at 16,916-17, 20,354.
183. Id. at 20,354.
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matters at a time when we could least afford it." 1 84 The act had cost NLRB
$275,000 in administrative and personnel costs alone in the first full year of
enactment. Nonetheless, EAJA once again became law in 1985.
The 1985 EAJA varied from the 1980 EAJA in several ways. The most
significant alterations are discussed more thoroughly in the following section, but in
essence the new version of the law resolved some conflicts by making 5 U.S.C. 504
and 28 U.S.C. 2412(d) (the administrative process and judicial sections,
respectively) more closely mirror each other,185 by establishing that the "position of
the United States" included the position underlying the litigation as well as its
position in the litigation, s8 and by specifying that any court inquiry in an EAJA
case must be based solely on the record, either the record generated in court or the
record generated before an agency. It also made EAJA permanent.
Subsequent to 1985, there were several more minor amendments to EAJA,
predominantly of a technical nature, including amendments in 1986,189 1988,190
1992,191 1993,192 1995,193 1996,194 1998,195 and 2011.196 The most significant of
these revisions was in 1992, when Congress added proceedings before the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims to the scope of EAJA, 197 and in 1995, when Congress
stopped the reporting of EAJA payments.198 Like any other law, EAJA has
constantly been adjusted to remain current.
184. Equal Access to Justice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Agency Admin. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 130 (1982) [hereinafter Equal Access to Justice].
185. Act of Aug. 5, 1985 § 1(c). For example, as originally drafted the net worth cap was clear in Title 5
but ambiguous in Title 28. Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Oversight Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. ofJustice ofthe H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.
3 (1982) [hereinafter Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act] (testimony of J. Paul McGrath,
Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice). The amendments corrected this. § 2(c), 99 Stat. at
185.
186. Act of Aug. 5, 1985 §§ 1(c), 2(c), 99 Stat. at 184, 185.
187. Id. at §§ 1(a), 2(b), 99 Stat. at 183, 184-85.
188. Id. at § 1(c), 99 Stat. at 184.
189. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 2, 100 Stat. 2085, 2095 (1986).
190. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 5239(b), 102 Stat. 3342,
3746 (1988).
191. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, §§ 301(a), 502(b), 506, 902(b)(1),
106 Stat. 4506, 4511, 4512, 4513, 4516 (1992).
192. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 4(b), 107 Stat. 1488, 1489
(1993).
193. Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-66, § 1091(b), 109 Stat. 707,
722 (1995) (repealing the Department of Justice reporting requirements).
194. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-121, §§ 231-32, 110 Stat. 847,
862-63 (1996).
195. Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-368, § 512, 112 Stat. 3315, 3341-
3342 (1998).
196. Act ofJan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 5(a), 124 Stat. 3677, 3841-42 (2011).
197. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 § 506, 106 Stat. at 4513.
198. Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995 § 1091(b), 106 Stat. at 722.
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B. Growing Pains: Controversial Inclusions and Exclusions in 1980, 1985, and
Subsequent Court Cases
Because EAJA created an unprecedentedly large exception to the American
Rule, it should be no surprise that it did not function perfectly from the onset. A
large amount of the 98th Congress's energy in reauthorizing EAJA in 1985 was
devoted to improving the act. Moreover, Supreme Court decisions, both direct
EAJA cases and some others, have had a great impact on EAJA as well. This
section will explore each significant issue in turn, highlighting the evolution of
EAJA and bringing its history down to the present.
1. Position of the United States
One issue that was unclear in the 1980 EAJA was the meaning of the "position
of the United States" that EAJA requires to be "substantially justified." Following
the passage of EAJA, courts differed on the proper interpretation of the "position of
the United States."1 99 The issue was whether the underlying action of the agency
should be considered or just the position of the government during the EAJA
litigation afterwards. As the Department of Justice explained, the Reagan
Administration was concerned that the "position of the United States" issue was
burdening the courts by trying the underlying claim not once, but twice, leading to
extensive discovery of how the underlying agency position was formulated. This
would inhibit free discussion and exchange of ideas within an agency for fear of
later discovery and judicial inquiry. The 98th Congress addressed this issue by
clarifying in H.R. 5479, their final EAJA reenactment bill, that the position of the
United States "includes the underlying agency action which led to the litigation."
To facilitate this, agencies and the courts considering EAJA applications were
directed to the administrative, factual record made before the agency or district
court. 200
The "position of the United States" issue lingered, however, because in
litigation the government sought ways to limit its liability under EAJA. One way it
did so was by attempting to distinguish between the underlying proceeding and the
EAJA proceeding. The government's argument was that so long as the
government's position in opposing the fees was "substantially justified," it should
not pay attorneys' fees incurred during the EAJA proceeding. The Supreme Court
ended the debate in the 1990 case Commissioner, INS v. Jean.20 1 In Jean, the Court
held that the government could not avoid paying for attorneys' fees incurred in a
successful fee application following a case that otherwise qualified for EAJA. 202
This definitively established that, for the purpose of evaluating the position of the
United States in an EAJA case, the entire case is a single unit. Fees ought to be
199. Equal Access to Justice, supra note 184, at 144.
200. Act of Aug. 5, 1985 §§ 1(a), 2(b), 99 Stat. at 183, 184-85.
201. 496 U.S. 154 (1990)
202. Id. at 161.
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denied for any issue on which the opposing party did not "prevail,"203 but there is
only one substantial justification determination in a given case. Jean marked the
end of the government's attempts to make arguments to the contrary.
2. Substantially Justified
In addition to having to refine the definition of "position of the United States"
after 1980, it was also necessary to settle the standard for "not substantially
justified." Congress struggled to define it over the three year period leading up to
EAJA. The determinative standard finally agreed upon in 1980 was a reasonable
basis rule, under which the government can avoid liability if it can demonstrate that
it had a reasonable basis in both law and fact for its action. This standard struck a
balance between the mandatory or presumptive fee awards proposed in early
versions of EAJA and the Department of Justice's recommended completely
discretionary award of fees where a court finds that the government's position was
"arbitrary, frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless." Moreover, the burden of proof
was placed on the government because it had control of the evidence and easier
access to knowledge of the facts in question. Congress believed it was easier for the
government to prove the reasonableness of its action than for a private party to
show that the government was unreasonable in its action.
However, some federal courts, particularly the D.C. Circuit, focused on a
Senate report from the 1980 EAJA deliberations that rejected the term "reasonably
justified" and instead held that a standard of "substantially justified" should be
used, which was more stringent than one of reasonableness. 204 In 1985, the House
Judiciary Committee issued a report approving of these cases, and explaining that
"[b]ecause in 1980 Congress rejected a standard of 'reasonably justified' in favor of
'substantially justified,' the test must be more than mere reasonableness." 205
However, the Congress as a whole never took a position on the issue, and no
correlative amendment was made to EAJA.
The issue instead passed to the Supreme Court, which settled it in 1988, in the
case Pierce v. Underwood.206 The Court held that the 1980 legislative history was
superior to the 1985 legislative history, for the latter was neither an authoritative
interpretation of the statute (the domain of the courts) nor an authoritative
expression of Congressional intent (being merely a House Committee report). 207
This ruling lessened the burden on the government, since the now uniform standard
to show that an action was substantially justified was the easier one, and reduced
the potential for over-zealous attorneys' fees awards under EAJA.208
203. Id. at 163.
204. E.g., Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 546-558 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
205. H.R. REP. No. 99-120, at 9 (1985); see Louise L. Hill, An Analysis and Explanation of the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 19 ARIz. ST. L. J. 229, 243 (1987).
206. 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
207. Id. at 566-67.
208. For more information on "substantially justified," including a detailed discussion of factors courts
consider in making the "substantially justified" determination, see Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the
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3. Prevailing Party - The Buckhannon Standard
To recover attorneys' fees and litigation costs under EAJA a petitioner has to
prove that he was the "prevailing party" in the outcome of a proceeding. Congress
again struggled to define the intent behind this term and ultimately construed the
standard broadly to mean prevailing on less than all the issues in a case. A
settlement or a dismissal, either voluntary or directed, in favor of the petitioner or
on an interim order central to the case, would be enough to be eligible to recover
one's attorneys' fees and costs. 209 This legislative history was consistent with the
landmark case Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club.210 Ruckelshaus interpreted a very
different type of fee-shifting statute, one that had existed for over a decade, which
provided for an award of fees "whenever appropriate." 211 In Ruckelshaus, the
Supreme Court determined that it was not "appropriate" to award attorneys' fees to
a party that did not achieve any success on the merits,212 but that total success was
not necessary either. 213
Ruckelshaus did not apply to EAJA, however, because EAJA only authorized
attorneys' fee awards to a "prevailing party." Several cases touched on the
"prevailing party" language over the years, and the Supreme Court finally issued a
definitive interpretation in 2001, in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West
Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources.214 Although not explicitly an
EAJA case,215 Buckhannon has been uniformly applied to EAJA. 216in
Buckhannon, the Court rejected the possibility that a party, through filing a lawsuit,
was a catalyst for government action who could recover attorneys' fees as a
Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards ofAttorney's Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part
Two), 56 LA. L. REV. 1, 18-78 (1995).
209. H.R. REP. No. 96-1005, pt. 1, at 9 (1980).
210. 463 U.S. 680 (1983)
211. When the case was decided, sixteen statutes used this language, including the Clean Air Act, the
Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act. For a full list, see id. at 682 nI. For a discussion of
interpretations of this language, see, for example, Joshua E. Hollander, Note, Fee-Shifting Provision in
Environmental Statutes: What They Are. How They Are Interpreted, and Why They Matter, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 633, 638-39 (2010).
212. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 694.
213. Id. at 690.
214. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
215. Cf Macon Dandridge Miller, Note, Catalysts as Prevailing Parties Under the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1347 (2002). Miller's piece, written shortly after Buckhannon came down,
argued the Buckhannon rule should not be applied to EAJA for a variety of reasons. Id. at 1348. Subsequent
holdings by lower courts uniformly disagreed with this analysis. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
216. E.g., Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d 84, 88-89 (1st Cir. 2009); Othman v. Chertoff, 309 F. App'x
792, 794 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion); Ma v. Chertoff, 547 F.3d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 2008);
Biodiversity Conservation Alliance v. Stem, 519 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2008); Morillo-Cedron v. Dist.
Dir. for the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 452 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2006); Goldstein v.
Moatz, 445 F.3d 747, 751 (4th Cir. 2006); Marshall v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 444 F.3d 837, 840 (6th Cir.
2006); Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663, 673-74 (2d Cir. 2005); Thomas v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 330 F.3d 486,
492 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 288 F.3d 1371, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 794-95 (9th Cir. 2002).
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prevailing party.217 The Court explained that "a defendant's voluntary change in
conduct. . . lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur"218 to convey "prevailing
party" status. This has been widely restated as holding that for there to be a
"prevailing party," there must be a "judicially sanctioned change in the legal
relationship of the parties." 219 In theory, this case ought to have reduced the number
of EAJA payments made to environmental organizations in out-of-court settlements
but, as will be shown, it has not. By stipulating that a catalyst party is the
"prevailing party" in a settlement agreement approved by court order pursuant to
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co.,220 plaintiffs have been able to achieve
"prevailing party" status merely by a settlement agreement (regardless of the
settlement terms) incorporated into a court's consent decree, notwithstanding
Buckhannon. 221
4. Defining the Limits of EAJA Eligibility: How to Qualify as a "Party" and the
Net-Worth Exception for 501 (c)(3) Organizations
Even leading up to the passage of EAJA in 1980, a fierce battle was fought
over the question of what sorts of parties qualified for EAJA awards. In particular,
key language in the House version of EAJA that required a party to have a direct
and personal interest in the proceedings to qualify for an EAJA award was deleted
during the Conference Committee's reconciliation of the two bills.222 The report of
the Committee on Small Business specified that this qualifying standard meant that
to qualify, a party must have been "injured, in imminent threat of injury, or [be]
likely to suffer irreparable harm." The Committee's expressed intent was that EAJA
"should not provide funds for intervenors, friends of the court or others who have
,,223not been injured. Ultimately this standard was not included in EAJA, and as
later history will show, the absence of this qualifying standard created a loophole in
EAJA that permitted environmental groups to repeatedly sue agencies and recoup
217. Buckhannon,532 U.S. at 600-01.
218. Id. at 605.
219. E.g. District of Columbia v. Jeppsen ex rel. Jeppsen, 514 F.3d 1287, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Dattner
v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 458 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 2006); John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. Cnty. Intermediate
Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 556, 559 (3d Cir. 2003).
220. In Kokkonen, the Supreme Court held that a district court can embody a settlement contract in an
order of dismissal, and thus retain jurisdiction over a settled case. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 5 11
U.S. 375, 381 (1994).
221. As one commentator put it "Because it appears that the catalyst theory is dead under EAJA,
plaintiffs must either obtain a 'judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,' or
incorporate fees into a court-approved settlement agreement." Patrick Parenteau, Citizen Suits Under the
Endangered Species Act: Survival of the Fittest, 10 WIDENER L. REv. 321, 349 (2004) (footnote omitted). A
more detailed history of the catalyst theory is available in Lucia A. Silecchia, The Catalyst Calamity: Post-
Buckhannon Fee-Shifiing in Environmental Litigation and a Proposal for Congressional Action, 29 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2004).
222. Notably, this standard is stricter than the standard for Art. III standing. See generally Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62 (1992). It would have been possible for a party to litigate
successfully, but not be deemed to have a direct enough interest to recover its attorneys' fees. See infra Part
3.B.
223. H.R. REP. No. 96-1005, pt. 1, at 9 (1980).
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millions in legal fees.
However, some qualifying standards were included. In the 1980 EAJA,
individuals with a net-worth exceeding $1 million were explicitly disqualified from
employing EAJA to recover legal fees, as were businesses with a net worth
exceeding $5 million. 224 In 1985, these limits were retained but increased to $2
million for individuals and $7 million for organizations.225
As finally passed, there were crucial exceptions to this cap on net-worth. One,
disingenuously labeled a "technical change" during the reconciliation of the House
and Senate bills, has had far-reaching consequences: a provision that non-profit
501(c)(3) organizations could utilize EAJA without regard to the net-worth
limitations that applied to private individuals and businesses. Notwithstanding
limited but spirited discussions regarding the role of 501(c)(3) organizations in
utilizing EAJA over the course of the six years of its legislative history, this
provision never appeared in any hearing, report, or legislative draft until it first
appeared on September 26, 1980 in the House Committee on the Judiciary Report
(96-1418) accompanying their review of S. 265. Just four days later, on September
30, 1980, the joint House and Senate Conference Committee Report was issued,
and the reconciled bill was approved by both the House and Senate the next day,
October 1, 1980. Neither report offered any explanation or reason for this key last-
minute addition to the bill. While the true history of the insertion will remain
shrouded in time, the later impact of this stealth amendment is measured in millions
of dollars in cost to the taxpayers.
The sudden appearance of the exception for 501(c)(3) organizations making it
easier for them to access EAJA funds is particularly shocking given the tone of the
prior debate on the issue. Debate on whether non-profit 501(c)(3) organizations
should be permitted to utilize EAJA at all began as early as 1976. Senator Mac
Mathias (D-MD) reflected the views of many who strongly believed that "public
interest" groups added to agency proceedings and needed to be included within
EAJA "to ensure their effective participation" as part of America's democratic
process.226 The central concept of the bill early on was to promote responsible and
responsive decision making for all Americans. Frequent reference was made during
the many hearings to legislation of the prior decade providing for the award of
attorneys' fees to the poor, minorities and women for civil rights enforcement,
which had enabled and stimulated intervention by public interest groups. 227In
essence, this view was that 501(c)(3)s, and especially public interest law firms,
represented and fulfilled the role of the public in agency and regulatory
deliberations when others could not due to a lack of financial and legal resources.
Many witnesses, however, questioned whether these "public interest" groups
were not really "special interest" groups in disguise, which really represented the
narrow views of a few. In defense, Senator Edward Kennedy, an early champion of
the bill, remarked, "[a]s you know, there have been comments made that this is sort
224. Equal Access to Justice Act §§ 203(a), (b), 94 Stat. at 2326, 2329.
225. Act of Aug. 5, 1985 §§ 1(c), 2(c), 99 Stat. at 183, 185.
226. Public Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings, S. 2715, supra note 126, at 4.
227. See id at 6, 174, 329.
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of a public service relief bill for lawyers. And it is very important that we disprove
that at the very outset." 228 The Southeastern Legal Foundation's position at many
hearings reflected the thinking of many opponents of the bill. They wanted
501(c)(3)s to be prohibited from utilizing EAJA because those groups were already
receiving a subsidy in the form of their tax exempt status, and did not need any
additional subsidies. The Southeastern Legal Foundation argued that, by the same
token, poorly funded organizations were not representative, and so were unworthy
of further subsidy. Finally, the group suggested that if non-profits were to be
allowed to utilize EAJA, then an organization's total award should be limited to a
hard cap of $5-10,000 in any one year.229 The widely-respected Judge George E.
MacKinnon of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
submitted a remarkably blunt assessment:
What this bill is really asserting is that interested citizens must be subsidized to
present their views to Federal agencies. I see no substantial proof to support that
assertion.... It has been my experience that meritorious views generally attract
their own financial support when they need it.
In practically every case I have seen where agency action is attacked by public
interest protestants or litigants they are usually very well funded by voluntary
organizations that enjoy tax-free status. 230
The Washington Legal Foundation reinforced Judge MacKinnon's position:
We fear that the biggest beneficiary of any provision allowing
successful plaintiffs to recover costs when suing the Federal Government
would be public interest law firms, whether liberal or conservative. We
question whether it is a good idea for the taxpayer to support the litigation
activities, even if successful, of public interest and special interest
groups....
Therefore we suggest that the Committee consider striking the words
"or against" from Section 203 and the bill be confined to the award of
attorneys' fees in cases where the federal agency has initiated the
action....
Alternatively, the Committee might consider revising the definition of
"party" provided in Subsection (d)(2)(B) to exclude non-profit associations
or organizations from coverage under the bill. Another solution would be
to insert a provision providing that only parties with a direct, personal stake
in the litigation would have "standing" to seek attorneys' fees. In any case,
we urge the Committee to give this matter careful consideration. This bill
must not be converted into a lawyer's relief act for the benefit of public
interest lawyers. 23 1
228. Id. at 54.
229. See Public Participation in Agency Proceedings, supra note 126, at 700 (testimony of Ben B.
Blackburn, President, Southeastern Legal Foundation); Public Participation in Government Proceedings Act
of 1976, supra note 132, at 58-59 (testimony of John T. C. Low, Southeastem Legal Foundation).
230. Public Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings Act of 1977, supra note 126, at 394.
231. Judicial Access/Court Costs, supra note 126, at 163-64 (statement of Daniel J. Popeo, General
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In essence, from 1976 on, the poles of debate were either that non-profits
should be entirely excluded from access to EAJA, or that they should be included
but subject to the same net worth limitation of $5 million that businesses and
individuals would be governed by. In no recorded testimony did any witness,
representative, or senator support an exemption releasing non-profits from any net-
worth restrictions. Nonetheless, the exemption mysteriously appeared in the final
law.
5. Social Security and Other Administrative Situations
A huge percentage of EAJA claims are filed against the Social Security
Administration.232 When it reauthorized EAJA in 1985, Congress wrestled with the
inclusion of fee awards in Social Security Act cases and Board of Contract Appeals,
neither of which had been included in the 1980 Act. The agency rather than the
adjudicative officer or hearing examiner was designated to make the final decision
on fee awards at the agency level, a point of contention during the three-year
experimental period,233 and ultimately EAJA was applied to these cases. 234In
particular, the 1985 amendments to EAJA specifically included a provision to
harmonize attorneys' fee applications under EAJA with attorneys' fee applications
under the Social Security Act so that individual claimants, and not their attorneys,
would benefit from the overlapping provisions.235 However, confusion over
specific applications of EAJA to Social Security claims persisted. A series of cases
dealing with narrow fact patterns gradually refined the issue, culminating in 1993
with Shalala v. Schaefer.236
Judicial review of decisions of the Social Security Administration is governed
by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which gives courts the power to conclude a claim or to make
a partial determination and remand the claim to the agency. In Schaefer, the Court
held that one category of remands, those under sentence four of § 405(g), were final
orders that qualified the claimant for EAJA, while another, those under sentence six
of § 405(g), were interim orders that did not qualify the claimant for EAJA,
although such claimants could later qualify for EAJA after their cases were
Counsel and National Executive Director, Washington Legal Foundation).
232. From 1985, the Department of Health & Human Service's (HIIHS) percentage of overall EAJA
applications varied from a minimum of 65.2% to a maximum 93.4%. Since the overwhelming majority of
HHS's EAJA caseload was Social Security cases, those cases clearly dominated EAJA activity. See ADMIN.
CONF. OF THE U.S., REP. OF CHAIRMAN OF ADMIN. CONF. ON AGENCY ACTIVITIES UNDER THE EQUAL
ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT (1982) [hereinafter ADMIN. CONFERENCE REPORTS]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT
BY THE DIRECTOR ON REQUESTS FOR FEES AND EXPENSES UNDER THE EOUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF
1980, in 1982 JUD. CONF. REP (1982) [hereinafter ADMIN. OFFICE REPORTS]; see also Comm'r, INS v.
Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 164 n.12 (1990); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. at 563.
233. See Act of Aug. 5, 1985 § 1(a)(3), 99 Stat. at 183.
234. See id. at §§ 1(c), 3, 99 Stat. at 184, 186.
235. See id. at § 3, 99 Stat. at 186; see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002) (discussing
same).
236. 509 U.S. 292, 294-95 (1993).
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concluded before the agency.237 This case brought clarity to the question of which
types of Social Security cases could receive attorneys' fees under EAJA, and when.
The determination that a remand under sentence four of § 405(g) immediately
qualified for an EAJA application was partially responsible for the surge of Social
Security EAJA claims in fiscal year 1994.238
It was initially unclear whether tax cases would be subject to EAJA, but the
Congress acted quickly on the uncertainty, directing tax cases in 1982239 to an
EAJA-like provision in the Internal Revenue Code. 24 0 Finally, in 1992 the scope of
EAJA was expanded by the inclusion of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims,
which is the dedicated appellate court for decisions of the Veterans
Administration.241
C. How an EAJA Claim Works
This Section completes the Article's discussion of the development of EAJA by
giving a brief primer on the operation of an EAJA claim. As discussed previously,
EAJA makes recovery available to a private party that prevails in an administrative
proceeding242 or lawsuit243 against the United States, its agencies, or officials.
Filing an EAJA claim is a simple matter: within thirty days after prevailing in a
proceeding against the United States, the party must file a motion for attorneys' fees
to the agency or court, stating and itemizing the fees requested, and alleging that the
position of the United States was not substantially justified.244 This allegation need
not be supported in any way; rather, the mere allegation is intended to require the
fee petitioner to "think twice," 245 and the burden of proof on the issue lies with the
government. 246
In order to file a petition to receive attorneys' fees under EAJA, the party must
meet other requirements. First and foremost, it must be a "prevailing party." This
requirement was authoritatively defined by Buckhannon,247 which has already been
discussed in detail.248 The essential test is that for there to be a "prevailing party,"
there must be a "judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the
237. Id. at 297-98.
238. See discussion infra pp. 48-49.
239. See the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324. (1982).
240. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(f) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(e) (2006).
241. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, § 506, 106 Stat. at 4513.
242. EAJA recovery is limited to "adversary adjudications," which are defined in the statute. "Adversary
adjudications" include proceedings under 5 U.S.C. § 554 "in which the position of the United States is
represented by counsel or otherwise," among others. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C).
243. Except for tort cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2006). For more on this exception, see Gregory C.
Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney's Fees for Unreasonable
Government Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L. REv. 217, 246-49 (1994).
244. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
245. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 415 (2004).
246. E.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. at 552, 557.
247. 532 U.S. at 600.




In addition to the "prevailing party" requirement, EAJA has further restrictions:
EAJA relief is only available to an individual with a net worth of under $2 million,
or an organization (including an "unincorporated business, or any partnership,
corporation, association, unit of local government, or organization") with a net
worth of under $7 million.250 In addition, organizations may not have more than
500 employees.251 However, 501(c)(3) corporations, 501(a) tax-exempt
organizations, and agricultural cooperative associations are all exempt from the $7
million net-worth cap.252
When a party is the recipient of an EAJA award, further conditions apply.
EAJA recovery is limited to $125 an hour, unless an "increase in the cost of living
or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys [or agents]
for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee." 253 In theory, this cap is
stringent: in 1988, the Supreme Court held that the "special factors" should be
limited to "attorneys having some distinctive knowledge or specialized skill needful
for the litigation in question." 254 As examples, the Court mentioned those familiar
with foreign law or a foreign language, as well as patent attorneys.255 In practice,
however, courts use market rates for their base calculations,256 and as a result
awards at rates above $125 an hour are commonplace, as will be discussed in Part
3.257
Attorneys' fees are not the only expense for which EAJA provides
compensation. EAJA specifically refers to "fees and other expenses," which are
defined as including "the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, [and] the
reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project which is
found by the court [or agency] to be necessary for the preparation of the party's
case."258 Expert witness fees are clearly limited to the amounts paid for expert
witnesses by the United States or the agency involved,259 but the rule for paralegal
fees has only recently been settled. In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
249. E.g. Bill M. ex rel. William M. v. Neb. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 570 F.3d 1001, 1004 (8th
Cir. 2009); District of Columbia v. Jeppsen ex rel. Jeppsen, 514 F.3d 1287, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Dattner
v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 458 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 2006); Highway Equip. Co. v. FECO, Ltd., 469 F.3d 1027,
1034 (Fed. Cir. 2006); John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. Cnty. Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 559 (3d Cir.
2003); Am. Disability Ass'n, Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002).
250. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(l)(B)(i)-(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
251. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii).
252. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii).
253. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii).
254. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. at 572.
255. Id. The patent example is particularly striking because patent attorneys, unlike other legal specialists,
must pass a specialized patent bar exam.
256. See, e.g., Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 579-80 (2008). Courts use many methods
to calculate "reasonable" fees; one very common tool is the Laffey Matrix and its variants, which several
courts use to set fees for attorneys in the Washington, D.C. area. E.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572
F. Supp. 354, 371 (D.D.C. 1983); see also Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 708
(3d. Cir. 2005).
257. See infra Part 3.A.
258. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).
259. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(l)(A)(i); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(i).
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paralegal fees are included in the expenses necessary for the party's case, and like
attorneys' fees are calculated based on market rates. 260 Finally, an award may be
reduced or denied "to the extent that the [prevailing party] during the course of the
proceedings engaged in conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final
resolution of the matter in controversy" 26 1 or if "special circumstances make an
award unjust."262
Once an EAJA proceeding has been concluded, it can be appealed. For the
most part, EAJA appeals follow normal appellate procedure, but there are some
nuances. In agency proceedings, judicial review is available, but only if sought by a
party other than the United States.263 In judicial proceedings, if the United States
chooses to appeal an award of EAJA fees and the award is affirmed in whole or in
part, the United States must pay interest on the award.264 Once the EAJA
proceeding is concluded, awards are paid "by any agency over which the party
prevails from any funds made available to the agency by appropriation or
otherwise."265
The procedural rules underlying EAJA applications illustrate the goals of the
legislation. Relief is primarily available to individual litigants and small
organizations. Once an application is made, the burden of proof rests with the
presumptively larger and wealthier government party, and the inquiry is limited to
the existing record. For claimants, adjudicative officers, and courts, the process is
designed to be simple and efficient.
III. EMERGING PROBLEMS WITH THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
Since Congress ended the reporting on the Equal Access to Justice Act in 1995,
it has been correspondingly difficult to assess the amounts of EAJA awards or the
patterns of EAJA use. Nevertheless, some data points have emerged, both positive
and negative.
The positive is easy to summarize. First, since Congress's expansion of EAJA
to cover the Court of Appeals for Veterans' Claims, those matters have grown to be
a consistent volume of traffic in much the same manner as Social Security. 266 Like
260. 553 U.S. at 571, 579-80.
261. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(C).
262. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). For a discussion of the "special circumstances"
provision, which is often ignored or conflated with substantial justification, see Louise L. Hill, Equal Access
to JusticeAct-Paving the Way for Legislative Change, 36 CASE. W. RES. L. REv. 50, 69-71 (1985).
263. 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
264. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(f.
265. 5 U.S.C. § 504(d); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(4). However, fees are not always paid in the manner
required by the statute. According to testimony on March 18, 2010 by Department of the Interior employee
Pamela Haze, funds for EAJA awards are often advanced by the Department of Justice and gradually
reimbursed, but "[m]any of the departments have not been keeping up with all of the reimbursements."
Conserving America's Land and Heritage: Department of the Interior FY 2011 Budget Request: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Interior, Environment and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations,
I 11th Cong. 363 (2010). It appears that Congress was aware of this issue at least as early as 2003, when the
Equal Access to Justice Reform Act was first introduced. See infra note 436 and. accompanying text.
266. See, e.g., Battling the Backlog Part II: Challenges Facing the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans'
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Social Security cases, these cases are eminently worthy ones: cases in which a
veteran making a claim has not only proven his position, but shown to the court's
satisfaction that the initial rejection of benefits by the agency was not substantially
justified. And again, like Social Security cases, the majority of these cases are small
payments which though modest to the federal government, have made all the
difference to claimants who otherwise could not have afforded the representation
they needed to get their claim properly addressed before an agency or court.
Second, the available evidence suggests that the volume of Social Security cases
has not fallen.267 Even though the intent of EAJA was to attempt to reform agency
behavior by taking payments directly out of agency budgets, it may be the case that
bureaucracies on the size and scale of the Social Security Administration simply
have an inherent rate of error, and that EAJA has become a compensatory
mechanism for innocent victims of its error. Though arguably unintended, it is a
salutary result.
However, a host of problems have developed with EAJA, to which this Part
now turns. It should be emphasized that these problems are not essentially
independent. The problem of abusive litigation, for instance, goes hand-in-hand
with the failure of the net worth cap as an effective prevention tool; the failure of
the net worth cap produces more repeat litigants and increases the government's
perverse incentives to settle; repeat litigants routinely exploit the exceptions to the
statutory cap, and thus raise the costs of EAJA generally, etc.
Nevertheless, it's overwhelming to examine all of EAJA's problems
simultaneously, and so Part 3 will proceed by analyzing each of the weaknesses of
the current regime individually, with examples. Many examples chosen for one
section apply equally well to other sections, thus showing the interdependence of
the problems.
Section A discusses the most immediate and obvious problem: the fact that in
many, if not most cases, EAJA's statutory cap is evaded, and Pierce's instructions
to lower courts to interpret the "special factor" language narrowly have been mostly
ignored, with a host of exceptions being carved out.
Section B then discusses the exemption of 501(c)(3) groups from the EAJA
net-worth caps, and how in the absence of reporting, 501(c)(3) groups have
aggressively used EAJA to take millions of dollars in attorneys' fees in drawn-out,
largely meritless procedural litigation.
Section C discusses the ability of groups to evade EAJA's requirements by
convincing the government to settle with pro-forma declarations of success, as well
Claims: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 109th Cong. 711 (2006) (testimony of Hon.
William P. Greene, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims regarding EAJA workloads in
the previous ten years, which ranged from 226 to over 1500 EAJA applications per year).
267. See discussion supra note 232. Though there is no extant data on the current volume of Social
Security cases, the volume in the final three years of reporting was as follows: in 1992, 252 applications
(92.3% of all EAJA applications); in 1993, 227 applications (86.3% of all EAJA applications); and in 1994,
2,206 applications (92% of all EAJA applications). ADMIN. CONFERENCE REPORTS, supra note 232; ADMIN.
OFFICE REPORTS, supra note 232; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT: 1993 ANNUAL
REPORT [hereinafter 1993 DOJ REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT: 1994
ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter 1994 DOJ REPORT].
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as the perverse incentive created by the decision in INS v. Jean for the government
to settle weak claims.
Section D then concludes by looking from a broad perspective at the costs of
the EAJA regime to the federal government as it currently stands.
A. The Evasion of the Statutory Cap
In Part 2.B, this article discussed the Supreme Court case Pierce v. Underwood,
which defined the "substantially justified" standard.268 Additionally, in that case,
the Supreme Court also held that EAJA's cap of $75 an hour (now $125 an hour)
on attorneys' fees, which by statute only can be exceeded due to an increase in the
cost of living or a "special factor," should be narrowly construed and the "special
factors" limited to "attorneys having some distinctive knowledge or specialized
skill needful for the litigation in question." 269 As examples, Justice Scalia's opinion
mentioned those familiar with foreign law or a foreign language, as well as patent
attorneys.270 If lower courts had obeyed this interpretation as faithfully as they have
its "substantially justified" interpretation, it might have reduced excessive
attorneys' fees awards under EAJA. Instead, it has been ignored, and environmental
lawyers are routinely awarded fees above the statutory cap, which has increased the
abuse of EAJA.271
The statutory cap is now a cap in name only. Not only is it exceeded for cost-
of-living adjustments, which is understandable as the cap is not tied to inflation, but
it is routinely exceeded both through the explicit justification of higher rates and
also fee calculations that treat the cap as an afterthought. 272
The practice of market-based fee calculations has even received the approval of
the Supreme Court: In Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff 273 the decision cited in
Part 2.C that deals with paralegals,274 the Court discusses attorneys' fees as
"incurred by the party," while noting that under EAJA, "incurred" fees are
calculated based on prevailing market rates and then reduced to the statutory cap,
and not connected to documented expenses cited by the parties.275 The use of
market rates in fee calculations predisposes agencies and courts to effectively
abrogate Pierce, for attorneys nearly everywhere now charge more than $125 an
268. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.at 563-65.
269. Id. at 572.
270. See id.
271. Justice Scalia's specific examples are properly regarded as dicta, or non-binding. See id.
Nonetheless, courts could have chosen to follow them.
272. Lower courts have never been satisfied with the Pierce standard for the cap. For a thorough, though
somewhat outdated, analysis of appellate interpretations of the standard, see Sisk, supra note 208, at 145-176.
The following discussion is limited to the abusive situations that are commonplace at present.
273. 553 U.S. 571 (2008).
274. See discussion supra pp. 34-35.
275. Id. at 577; see also Sisk, supra note 208, at 105-127. This is in the context of calculating the amount
of fees incurred. The question of if fees are incurred in the first place is more complex, especially when




hour. In Washington, D.C., for example, where much environmental litigation takes
place, according to the 2011 Laffey Matrix, a first-year attorney should be paid
$305 per hour and a paralegal should be paid $165.276 Because the Laffey Matrix is
defined as a "reasonable" fee, 277 the implication is that it is unreasonable to obey
the dictates of Pierce and the language of EAJA. Thus the clear holding of Pierce
has arguably become a dead doctrine in practice.
An example of the fee calculations in a typical EAJA case exemplifies evasion
of the statutory cap. In Nadarajah v. Holder,278 the Ninth Circuit awarded fees
under EAJA in a habeas corpus petition. When all was said and done, petitioner
received $156,778.68 for 658.45 hours of work,279 for an average hourly rate of
$238.10. In making this award, the court made several determinations that illustrate
how far the application of EAJA has drifted from the intent behind the legislation,
and how easily that drift is exploited by non-profit environmental organizations.
First, the court held that petitioner's attorneys had "distinctive knowledge and
specialized skill in immigration law."280 Although the court explicitly did not assert
that immigration law per se is "a specialty similar to patent law,"281 it followed the
law of several circuit courts in holding that subspecialties within immigration law
could merit fees in excess of EAJA's statutory cap. 282 In particular, the Nadarajah
court cited "specialized expertise in constitutional immigration law and litigation
involving the rights of detained immigrants."283 The court awarded fees at markets
rates despite the government's objection that the case "turned on statutory
interpretation and did not involve the application of complex statutes or
regulations."284 The implication of the Department of Justice's argument is that in
general it accepts that "complex statutes or regulations" are now an established
expertise meriting fees in excess of EAJA's statutory rate. Finally, the court also
found that the petitioner had established the un-rebutted presumption that no
qualified counsel would have taken his case if payment was limited to the statutory
cap of $125 an hour.285
But the court's justifications for exceeding the statutory cap did not end there.
The government raised an issue very relevant in environmental litigation, which
was that the petitioner was represented in part by the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), and "did not submit his retainer agreement with the ACLU, or
evidence of the ACLU employees' hourly salaries, and therefore the court cannot
276. Laffey Matrix, http://www.laffeymatrix.com/see.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2011). There is some
unreality to this, as of course, almost no paralegals make $165 an hour; but it is routine practice for law firms
to bill their time at vastly inflated rates.
277. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354, 361 (D.D.C. 1983).
278. 569 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2009).
279. Id. at 926.
280. Id. at 912.
281. Id. at 913.
282. Including the 3rd, 7th, and 9th Circuits. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 914.
285. Id. at 915.
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evaluate the appropriateness of the fee request."286 The court was dismissive of this
argument, because "the award of attorneys' fees ... is not cost-based, and ... the
award of prevailing market rates-regardless whether the claimant is represented by
private counsel or a non-profit legal services organization-should not be viewed as
an unjustified 'windfall' profit to the attorney." 287 This was the holding of Hensley
v. Eckerhart, a civil rights case,288 but it was applied to EAJA cases as well by
Jean.289 In essence, Nadarajah is an example of the principle that an EAJA
claimant is always entitled to receive attorneys' fees at market rates, irrelevant of if
and how much the claimant paid or did not pay for the services of the attorneys in
the case.290 The only obstacle is establishing that the attorneys had sufficient
expertise.
In fairness, that determination does come into play in some cases. In
Nadarajah, for example, Judge Tallman filed a partial dissent, largely because he
disagreed with the determination that the petitioner's attorneys had expertise
meriting fees in excess of the statutory rate.291 The same conservative application
of the Pierce standard can be found in Ace Constructers, Inc. v. United States, 292a
Court of Federal Claims case. In that case, a government contractor prevailed in a
suit against the Army Corps of Engineers dealing with construction at a military
facility.293 The court denied petitioner's request for EAJA fees above the statutory
maximum expressly because it was not convinced by petitioner's claims that
limited attorneys were available to them, that their attorneys had a "specialized
practice of construction litigation, with particular emphasis on public construction
projects and government contracts," and that the case presented "numerous and
complex" issues.294 The court held that the "nature of the case" did not fall "within
the 'identifiable practice specialty' contemplated by the Supreme Court in
Pierce."295 Instead, the court limited fees to the statutory cap plus a cost of living
increase, although even then it awarded petitioner $127,669.73296 for 809.2
hours,297 at an average hourly rate of $157.77.
The pattern of evading the statutory cap by broadly construing the Pierce
standard can be seen in a variety of environmental cases. One recent, particularly
large award saw the Natural Resources Defense Council receive $503,628.03 in
attorneys' fees 298 for 1,612.4 hours of work, 299 at an average hourly rate of
286. Id. at 916.
287. Id.
288. 461 U.S. 424 (1983)
289. See Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 160.
290. Although this case dealt with the ACLU specifically, the principle is equally applicable to any
provider of pro bono representation through the Jean court's adoption of Hensley.
291. Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 926 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
292. 81 Fed. Cl. 161 (2008).
293. Id. at 173.
294. Id. at 168.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 169.
297. Id. at 168 n.6.
298. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Locke, 771 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
299. Id. at 1212; Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses and Memorandum in Support at 22,
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$312.35. Unlike the above-cited cases, in this case the government conceded that
"[e]nvironmental law is a recognized specialty for which enhanced rates are
appropriate," that NRDC's attorneys "possess environmental legal expertise[]
that ... was necessary in this case" and "that NRDC could not have secured other
qualified counsel at the statutory rate." 300 With the government failing to even
request a Pierce inquiry there was no need for the court to make one, but it seems
likely that the court would have found for NRDC if asked. 301 In fact, in granting the
award, the court praised NRDC for seeking fees for slightly less than two-thirds of
the hours its attorneys actually worked, and for applying an additional ten percent
reduction in its claim, ultimately "seeking recovery for just over half of the time
spent on this case." 302 Thus, the court's justification for awarding NRDC half a
million dollars at two and a half times the statutory rate was to point out that the
government only objected to the hours, not the rate, and to praise NRDC for not
seeking a full million dollars.
Cases like this abound. In a recent EAJA claim against the Department of
Agriculture, Citizens for Better Forestry received attorneys' fees totaling
$166,918.18 for 444.2 hours of work, at an average hourly rate of $375.77.303 In the
same case, Defenders of Wildlife received attorneys' fees totaling $248,903.46 for
463.5 hours of work, for an average hourly rate of $537.01.304 As in the NRDC
case, in this case the court detenrmined that the environmental attorneys who worked
on the case for the petitioners possessed necessary expertise justifying fee awards in
excess of the statutory cap in EAJA. o0 In this case, it did so despite the fact that the
Department of Agriculture strenuously objected to the overall fee awards306 and to
the justification for the rates 307 and hours308 claimed by each individual attorney in
the case. It must be cautioned that the attorneys' fees claimed in this case were
characterized as claimed under both EAJA and the citizen suit provision of the
Endangered Species Act, which does not have a statutory cap.309 However, the
environmental groups' claim was based on a faulty environmental impact
statement,3o and that is fundamentally a National Environmental Policy Act claim,
for which EAJA governs awards of attorneys' fees. Thus, although it would be
necessary to access internal Department of Justice records to be certain, it seems
safe to characterize this massive fee award as pursuant to EAJA.
Locke, 771 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 01-0421).
300. Locke, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 1210.
301. In fact, it is settled law in the Ninth Circuit that notwithstanding Pierce, environmental expertise is
an "identifiable practice specialty that requires distinctive knowledge" cognizable for EAJA purposes. Love v.
Reilly, 924 F.2d 1492, 1496 (9th Cir. 1991).
302. Locke, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
303. Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., No. 08-1927, 2010 WL 3222183, at *14-15
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010).
304. Id. at *15.
305. Id. at *4-5.
306. Id. at *5.
307. Id. at *6-9.
308. Id. at *9-14.
309. 16 U.S.C. § 154 0(g) (2006).
310. Citizensfor Better Forestry, 2010 WL 3222183, at *1.
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In the environmental arena, it is clear that EAJA's statutory fee cap of $125 an
hour hardly applies; even if the government chooses to fight to apply the fee cap, it
is a negligible obstacle to overcome. In the rare cases when the cap is applied
faithfully, cost of living increases alone have become substantial enough to make
the fixed cap seem dated. EAJA fees are being awarded at hourly rates anywhere
from $157.77 to $537.01. This marginalizes the cap, and it also creates tremendous
cost uncertainty for the government. If the volume of litigation or the market rates
for attorneys' fees increase in the future, the situation will only become worse.
B. The 501(c) (3) Exemption, and Abusive Procedural Litigation
The exemption of 501(c)(3) groups from the EAJA net-worth cap posed a clear
potential problem from the outset. EAJA allows recovery in any case where fee-
shifting is not otherwise provided for, and the federal government is the defendant.
As one might guess, many of the challenges permitted under the APA are
procedural (thus, "Administrative Procedure Act"). These challenges can often
have the effect of changing agency action when the agency has seriously misjudged
the data or bypassed the data in favor of a political result, and when a proper
examination would practically mandate another result. But these challenges can
often also just lead to unnecessary delay; the courts will basically order an agency
to return to square one and do it analysis more completely or in more detail311 and
the agency does, but the underlying decision or policy is left unchanged,312 since
the scope of court review is to determine whether or not what an agency did was
permissible, not if it was correct (as a matter of policy, that is). 313 Now, even this
latter result can sometimes have a useful public purpose in making sure that
agencies adopt publicly well-reasoned policies, 314 especially when the decision is a
particularly momentous or unique one. Nevertheless, the potential for abuse is
clear: consistent procedural litigation could cause an endless backlog of delays, or
even the abandonment of regulatory action,315 as the precision and justification for
government action that the APA formally demands is in practice extremely costly
and difficult to achieve. This is especially true when delaying an action is a victory
311. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 200 (1947) [hereinafter Chenery II] ("[In Chenery 1],
[w]e held no more and no less than that the Commission's first order was unsupportable for the reasons
supplied by that agency . . .. The administrative process had taken an erroneous, rather than a final, turn.
Hence, we carefully refrained from expressing any views as to the propriety of an order rooted in the proper
and relevant considerations.") (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) [hereinafter Chenery I])
(internal citations omitted).
312. E.g., Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 209-10 ("The Court by this present decision sustains the identical
administrative order which only recently it held invalid. As the Court correctly notes, the Commission has
only 'recast its rationale and reached the same result."') (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
313. Id. at 209 ("The Commission's conclusion here rests squarely in that area where administrative
judgments are entitled to the greatest amount of weight .... Whether we agree or disagree with the result
reached, it is an allowablejudgment which we cannot disturb.") (emphasis added).
314. Id.
315. A former Chief of the U.S. Forest Service has described this dynamic in play in litigation against his
agency. Jack Ward Thomas, Chief Emeritus, U.S. Forest Serv., Speech: The Future of the National Forests -
Who Will Answer an Uncertain Trumpet? (Winter, 2006), in CHALLENGES FACING THE U.S. FOREST SERV. -
A CRITICAL REVIEW (Daniel Kemmis, ed. 2008).
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for the group-or can be marketed to its followers and contributors as a victory. 316
Historically, the predominant counterbalance to the problem was a natural
economic one: lawyers are expensive.317 It would cost a prohibitive amount to most
groups to hire legal talent in order to consistently abuse the APA to slow down
agencies, and it would be seen as a patent waste of money considering that this kind
of opposition would at best achieve delays, and would breed resentment among the
agencies towards the groups and causes harassing them. So one could simply not
bring all theoretically meritorious APA challenges, nor, in most cases, would one
want to.
The 501(c)(3) exemption disrupts this cost deterrence. If a 501(c)(3) group with
a radical agenda sues the government on substantively flimsy but technically
correct procedural grounds, it can (depending on how "prevailing party" is applied)
win EAJA fees for the litigation, effectively removing the costs of delaying the
agency. And if this step is costless it can be repeated at will, paralyzing the agency
from ever taking action. Or even worse, if groups could convince the government to
pay attorneys' fees that were effectively higher than their actual outlay (by
convincing the court to pay market rate instead of the EAJA cap), they could profit
from continuously suing the government, particularly given the well-known
discrepancies between the pay for public-interest legal work and the pay at the high
end of the legal market. 318 Notably, the median salary for a public interest lawyer
316. Another example of this can be found in the greater Yellowstone ecosystem, covering three states,
where the gray wolf was reintroduced in 1995-96 as a "nonessential experimental population." The official
1987 Northern Rocky Mountain Recovery Plan provided that a sustainable population would be reached-and
the wolf would be "recovered"-when three states (Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming) had a combined total of
300 wolves comprising thirty breeding pairs for three successive years. That objective was reached in 2002.
But because of prolonged litigation initiated by the Humane Society of the United States and others, state
management plans have been prevented from being implemented. Today the wolf population is 1,706-over
5.6 times the 1987 agreed upon figure of 300. Congress finally ended seventeen years of litigation through
legislation, but the plaintiffs achieved their goal of expanding the wolf population well beyond the recovery
goal set in 1987, simply by continuing to litigate. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, NORTHERN ROCKY
MOUNTAIN WOLF RECOVERY PLAN (1987), available at
http://www.fws.gov/montanafieldoffice/EndangeredSpecies/RecoveryandMgmtPlans/NorthernRocky
MountainGrayWolf Recovery Plan.pdf; U.S. Nat'l Park Serv., U.S. Dep't Interior, Wolves of Yellowstone
(Aug. 15, 2011, 11:21 MST), http://www.nps.gov/yell/naturescience/wolves.htm.
Attorneys' fees have been awarded in this case: the plaintiffs initially petitioned the court for $673,950 in
attorneys' fees and costs. Their amended motion requested $388,370 in fees and costs, which on objection by
the government the court reduced to $263,099. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and
Costs, Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Mont. 2008) (No. 08-cv-00056). For an
example of typical coverage of the wolf issue by an environmental group, see Earthjustice, Wolves in Danger,
http://earthjustice.org/ourwork/campaigns/wolves-in-danger (last visited Sep. 16, 2011). Note the prominent
appeal for contributions.
317. See, e.g., Laffey, 572 F. Supp. 354; Laffey Matrix, supra note 276 and accompanying text.
3 18. This issue has been insufficiently studied at present, but it is related to the broader issue of plaintiffs
with economic motives. Although EAJA explicitly is meant to aid businesses, the question of profit is
historically controversial in environmental litigation. See, e.g., Michael Lee, Comment, Attorneys' Fees in
Environmental Citizen Suits and the Economically Benefited Plaintiff When Are Attorneys' Fees and Costs
Appropriate?, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 495 (2009). Of course, attorneys' fees are only one way organizations
can profit; simple settlements are often even more lucrative. See, e.g., Julie Wootton, El Paso rep: Pipeline
settlement has caused 'worry, concern and anger', ELKO DAILY FREE PRESS, (Aug. 4, 2010, 10:46 PM),
available at http://elkodaily.com/news/locallarticleObdd540-a055-1 I df-9756-001cc4cO3286.html
(describing anger at a $20 million settlement between El Paso Corp., a pipeline builder, and Western
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with 11-15 years of experience in 2010 was $70,085; the median salary for a first-
year associate at a large (500+ lawyers) firm was $135,000. 319 Depending on what
figure was picked for "market rate,"320 the public interest firm could more than
recoup what it paid its lawyers and pocket the rest.
A factor that mitigated this problem was the fact that Congress wisely put in
reporting requirements mandating that courts and agencies report on how many
EAJA fee awards were requested, by whom, and how much was being paid out; as
noted above, Congress was concerned about the possible costs of EAJA. If
501(c)(3) groups began abusing EAJA, the pattern would become clear in the
reporting, and Congress could nip it in the bud. And it probably would have been a
public relations nightmare for any particular 501(c)(3) group caught effectively
bilking the government out of funds, so this likely deterred groups from abusing
EAJA.
Unfortunately, in passing the Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of
1995,321 Congress looked at the history of EAJA reporting from 1981 to 1995,322
saw an EAJA program that effectively had stayed at a few million dollars a year
total without much growth, and decided the reporting provision was superfluous
(and of course incurring a cost itself), eliminating it entirely.323 Now the coast was
clear for 501(c)(3) groups to profit: there was no reporting, and no one would know
how much money the groups were making in suing agencies. Without centralized
reports, it was hard for anyone to accurately gauge whether the rate of EAJA
activity was staying constant or increasing. Meanwhile, at the same time it had
become clear that courts were calculating EAJA fees not from the actual costs
incurred in a representation, or from how much the actual attorneys (many of whom
were in-house or pro bono) cost, but rather from a reasonable fee for a private
attorney.324 So courts would not object if environmental litigants claimed attorneys'
fees well in excess of what they themselves were paying their in-house counsel.
Sure enough, after 1995 the agencies began to get a distinct sense that EAJA
was being used against them in the context of more and more aggressive litigation,
particularly in environmental contexts. Ironically, this litigation seemed to be worst
at the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS), one of the most over-worked and least-
adequately funded of all the federal agencies. By the mid-2000's, such abuse was
clearly rampant. Throughout 2010-2011, several outside groups conducted studies
of various degrees and scope to try to determine the extent of the problem. Some of
the findings were quite shocking.
Watersheds Project and the Oregon Natural Desert Association).
319. New Findings on Salaries for Public Interest Attorneys, NALP BULLETIN, September 2010,
available at http://www.nalp.org/sept20l0pubintsal (last visited July 28, 2011).
320. Notably, they could refer to standardized figures like the Laffey matrix. See supra notes 276-277 and
accompanying text.
321. Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-66, 109 Stat. 707 (1995).
322. See infra note 330.
323. Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995 § 1091(b) ("REPORT ON EQUAL ACCESS
TO JUSTICE- Section 2412(d)(5) of title 28, United States Code, is repealed.").




For instance, consider the case of NRDC v. Salazar,325 found in a study of
EAJA cases closing in the 2009-2010 period. In that case, the mega-million-
dollar326 501(c)(3) Natural Resources Defense Council (also using attorneys from
Earthjustice) sued the Department of the Interior in 2005, claiming that FWS's
2004 biological opinion on the impact of two state water projects-the Central
Valley Project and the State Water Project-on the threatened delta smelt was
"arbitrary and capricious."327 They kept the agency in court for more than six
years,328 and the only thing they managed to win was a court order making FWS
submit a revised, improved biological opinion in 2009.329 What was NRDC's
payout for this essentially meaningless victory? It was $1,906,500, a figure justified
in NRDC's motion for attorneys' fees by their and Earthjustice's special expertise
in environmental litigation. Notably, this fee award is more in a single court case
than had been granted against the entire Interior and Agriculture Departments in the
entire thirteen-year history of the reporting period for both agency AND court
cases.330 Moreover, that 1.9 million dollar figure is also more than the usual yearly
payout of the entire EAJA program (which is to say, both agency and court costs,
for the entire federal government and all of its agencies) throughout the reporting
period 1982-1994!331 Only in 1986, 1987, and 1994 did EAJA payments reach
more than $1.9 million, and in 1994, there were several miscellaneous reasons
regarding the timing of Social Security case payouts (which usually form the
overwhelming bulk of EAJA payments-more than seventy-five percent of volume
in most years) for the spike. 332
Were this not troubling enough, the Center for Biological Diversity filed a
petition on March 9, 2006 to reclassify the delta smelt-the same species that was
the focus of the above litigation-from threatened to endangered. Though FWS
published a ninety day finding concluding the petition might have merit, and began
a status review, it missed its twelve month deadline to make a final decision, and
was immediately sued by the Council for Endangered Species Act Reliability
(CESAR) for missing the deadline. This lawsuit settled, and CESAR accepted
$35,000 in attorneys' fees for essentially harassing the over-worked FWS. 333
Or consider a case called Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's
325. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Salazar, No. 1:05-cv-01207-OWW-GSA (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2009).
326. 2010 net worth: $183,873,198. NRDC, NRDC Financial Report (2010), available at
http://www.nrdc.org/about/annual/finances.pdf.
327. See Plaintiffs Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Salazar (No. 1:05-cv-0 1207). The standard for winning a case in the APA is to show agency action is arbitrary
and capricious.
328. See id.
329. See Interim Remedial Order Following Summary Judgment and Evidentiary Hearing, id. (No. 1:05-
cv-01207) (Jan. 28, 2011).
330. Cf ADMIN. CONFERENCE REPORTS, supra note 232; ADMIN. OFFICE REPORTS, supra note 232; 1993
DOJ REPORT, supra note 267; 1994 DOJ REPORT, supra note 267.
331. Cf sources cited supra note 330.
332. Cf sources cited supra note 330.
333. Council for Endangered Species Act Reliability v. Salazar, No. 1:09-cv-02091-OWW-DLB (E.D.
Cal. Sept. 8, 2010).
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Associations/Institute for Fisheries Resources v. Guiterrez.334 The Pacific Coast
Federation, represented in no small coincidence by the same attorneys from NRDC
and Earthjustice who had litigated NRDC v. Salazar, filed an almost identical case
in 2006, this time adding the Department of Commerce to the list of defendants as
well as The Department of Interior and FWS. The issue at hand in the lawsuit? That
FWS's 2005 biological opinions on the impact of the Central Valley Project and the
State Water Project (the same projects at issue in NRDC v. Salazar) on three
salmonid species were deficient. 335 The outcome for this practically carbon-copied
litigation? It was $2,193,550 in attorneys' fees. 336 So the same attorneys bringing
an almost identical complaint regarding the same agency's actions on the same two
projects over the same time span were allowed to recover years' worth of litigation
fees on basically redundant cases and work. One might fault the Department of
Justice for not moving to consolidate this case with NRDC v. Salazar (and get the
costs a little under control), but the abusive intent of these cases is obvious. And to
add insult to injury, these cases could later be cited by the NRDC and Earthjustice
attorneys as specialized expertise, thus justifying ever-higher attorneys' fees for
those groups.
C. Losing Cases, Settlements, and the Jean Incentive
Another problem that has emerged in the EAJA context is the confluence of
perverse incentives on the part of both the EAJA filer and the government to settle.
There are three aspects to this problem: the financial incentives created by Jean, the
Buckhannon case's malleable standard for the prevailing party, and the
government's authority and incentives to settle.
The Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Jean, discussed above in Part 2, ties
litigation regarding EAJA awards into an EAJA award itself. Jean resolved a
potential problem in EAJA where the government might have plausibly claimed
that though it had not been substantially justified in its initial action, it nevertheless
was justified in opposing a fee motion, or an appeal of that motion, etc. There were
only two possible ways out of the possible recursion problems. One was to
automatically make the further litigation linked to the initial "substantial
justification" issue, so that if a party was entitled to EAJA fees on the merits, it was
automatically entitled to fees for contesting the government's attack on its award;
this is the route taken by the Jean court, quite plausibly seeing it as the closest fit to
Congress's intent with EAJA. The other route would have been to automatically
deny all fees related to the award itself.
Though a neat and logical solution, this resolution highly incentivizes the
government to not contest EAJA awards in close cases or in cases where the
plaintiff s demands are easier to simply meet than to litigate over, and instead try to
334. Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Ass'n/Inst. for Fisheries Res. v. Guiterrez, No. 1:06-cv-
00245-OWW-GSA (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2008).
335. See Plaintiffs Notice of Motion and Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, id. (No.
1:06-cv-00245-OWW-GSA).
336. See Stipulation to Settle Attorneys' Fees and Costs, id. (No. 1:06-cv-00245-OWW-GSA).
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settle them for less. Contrariwise, a plaintiff who knows their case is weak can use
the specter of increased costs via Jean in a victory to push the government to
settle.337
Moreover, the plaintiff has a strong motive to constantly push for settlement in
the first place. If the government settles the main case, Buckhannon comes into
play. In theory, Buckhannon should have prevented settlement from being adequate
to garner attorneys' fees, since in ruling out the 'catalyst theory,' Buckhannon made
a sharp distinction between voluntary changes in behavior of a party and the
judicially-stamped imprimatur on a change in legal relationship between the parties
wrought by court action.338 A settlement agreement is usually thought to be a prime
example of the former, not the latter.
Unfortunately, there are many ways to fulfill the letter of Buckhannon, if not its
spirit. The easiest way is to stipulate that the court will have continuing jurisdiction
to oversee enforcement of the settlement. Many courts have held that this is
sufficient involvement by the court to grant 'prevailing party' status. Alternately,
the parties can simply stipulate that one party is the prevailing party, which
frequently occurs. In that case the plaintiff can subsequently file for an award under
EAJA, which is difficult to rebut, given the stipulation, or, more often, make an
EAJA motion, and then settle for EAJA fees in an addendum or as part of the
overall settlement.
It must be recalled that the government's authority to enter into settlement
agreements is unmediated and unreviewable, and can be used in any manner the
Attorney General or his/her designees see fit: to appease repeat litigants, to cut
losses, to foreclose judicial review of an activity, or any other reason. Since the
Department of Justice handles all litigation on behalf of the federal government,
there can be a significant mismatch of incentives or motivations, even within the
government. 339
This confluence of factors can result in some very unmeritorious cases
garnering fees. Consider the case of the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow. 340 Advocates
for the West, Defenders of Wildlife, Forest Guardians, National Audubon Society,
Sierra Club, and Southwestern Environmental Center sued the Bureau of
Reclamation regarding the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow and the Bureau of
Reclamation's supposed failure to consider the impacts to the species of various
water management issues in a final biological opinion regarding the species issued
by FWS for the Bureau.341 In the case, litigated for more than ten years, including
337. Ironically, this places the government in the exact situation that small business faced when EAJA
was first passed: rather than fight on the merits, it is forced to "knuckle under," in the words of Senator
Domenici.
338. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
339. Among other litigation functions, the Department of Justice executes the Attorney General's
authority to enter into settlements in "imminent litigation or suits." 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (2006). This authority is
absolute. For a thoughtful treatment of the danger it poses, see generally Todd David Peterson, Protecting the
Appropriations Power: Why Congress Should Care About Settlements at the Department of Justice, 2009
BYU L. REv. 327 (2009).
340. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973 (D.N.M. 2002).
341. Id. at 976.
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an appeal to the Tenth Circuit (which affirmed the lower court),342 the plaintiffs
managed to lose on every point with one technical exception.
First, the judge found that FWS had not failed to receive and use the best
available scientific data; though they had committed a minor procedural violation of
the Endangered Species Act because the Bureau had not consulted with FWS about
the possibility of using two different sources of water to protect the minnow, even
that failure had not rendered the biological opinion invalid.343 The court denied
their challenges to the Bureau for failure to conserve the species and causing
jeopardy as unripe.344 In whole, the judge simply affirmed the final biological
opinion issued by FWS. 345
The plaintiffs, however, cited two things in moving for EAJA fees. The first
were voluntary changes made by FWS in response to their litigation-
considerations that are clearly irrelevant under Buckhannon, since they would be
arguing a textbook 'catalyst' case. The other was some commendatory and
sympathetic remarks made by the judge in praising the plaintiffs' performance:
"Even though I am constrained by the highly deferential standard of review to
affirm the final Biological Opinion issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service on June
29, 2001," notably, the only actual issue in the case,
I believe it is appropriate to compliment Plaintiffs' counsel for their work on
behalf of the endangered silvery minnow and the entire middle Rio Grande system.
It is my impression that at the time this lawsuit was filed, not much was being done
by the federal agencies, or by the other major players with interests in the middle
Rio Grande, to confront seriously the hard, difficult issues ... [b]y filing this
lawsuit, the Plaintiffs' attorneys got the ball rolling ... . As a result, Plaintiffs
prevailed on at least one significant issue in the case.346
Now, it is difficult to say what motivated the judge in this case to say that the
plaintiffs had prevailed on a "significant issue." Only a few paragraphs above, he
noted that though he had found that "a procedural violation of the Endangered
Species Act did occur . .. the Biological Opinion is not arbitrary and capricious as a
result of this procedural violation." 347 That is to say, the supposedly "significant"
issue the plaintiffs' counsel had prevailed on was meaningless to the disposition of
the case.
Nevertheless, there was the very real possibility of an EAJA award to the
plaintiffs, since they had "prevailed on at least one significant issue in the case" if
one took the language literally. This consolation gesture on the judge's part (one
must keep in mind that they lost substantively), and their technical victory in
revealing a minor procedural defect, led the plaintiffs to move for $1.845 million in
attorneys' fees. 348 Again, the claim was legally dubious: Buckhannon rules out
342. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1133 (10th Cir. 2010).
343. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 1002-03.
346. Id. at 1002.
347. Id.
348. Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses at 8, Rio Grande Silvery
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"catalyst" claims, and the court did not give the plaintiffs any substantive legal
relief or change any aspect of the legal relationships between the parties, so the case
would not meet any aspect of Buckhannon. The federal government though,
perhaps wanting to simply end this incredibly lengthy ten-year case, and mindful
that if they lost, even procedurally, further litigation regarding the attorneys' fees
would itself increase attorneys' fees and be recoverable for the plaintiffs under the
Jean doctrine, settled for a still shockingly large $822,003.74.349 Similar borderline
cases in which EAJA plaintiffs supposedly "prevail" are not hard to find.350
D. The Growing Costs ofEAJA
The costs to the federal government of the exploitable EAJA system go deep,
and so does the waste of taxpayer funds. Congress was initially hesitant to make
EAJA a permanent law because it feared the potential costs of EAJA, and its initial
inclusion of a sunset clause matched this worry, as did the inclusion of reporting
provisions. However, from 1981-1985, the maximum total yearly expenditure for
EAJA, from both 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412, had never gone above $2.1
million. 351 (The Department of Justice, recall, had been afraid of an expense in the
range of $250 million per year!) Congress was thus willing to make EAJA
permanent, though it retained the reporting provision.
The later expenses in the reporting period for EAJA were not particularly
discouraging to Congress either. Through 1993, EAJA payouts never went past
$3.9 million (not adjusted for inflation);352 and though in 1994, the total payout
spiked to a considerably higher $8.2 million, this change was due to several well-
explained factors.3 53  The predominant factor was a change in reporting
methodology for 28 U.S.C. § 2412 cases which caused the number of cases to
modestly increase in some areas, but skyrocket for Health and Human Services
(covering Social Security cases, which compose the bulk of EAJA, having never
been less than forty-two percent of cases, and by 1985 onwards consistently being
upwards of ninety percent of cases, with commensurately large proportions of
payouts, though relatively low average actual awards, since they are small
cases). 354 The second was the application of EAJA to Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims cases by the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992; volumes
of those cases began to climb after that law became applicable in 1993. 35 And the
third was a major Supreme Court case decided in 1993, Schaefer v. Shalala, which
Minnow, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973 (D. N.M. 2002) (No. 99-1320).
349. Plaintiffs' and Federal Defendants' Join Stipulation Resolving Plaintiffs' June 26, 2010 "Motion for
Award of Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses," Dkt. No. 710 at 1, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 469 F.
Supp. 2d 973 (D. N.M. 2002) (No. 99-1320).
350. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement Respecting Attorneys' Fees and Costs at 3, Fund for Animals v.
Hall, No. 03-0677 (D.D.C. Sept. 2, 2011).
351. See sources cited supra note 330.
352. Id.
353. 1994 DOJ REPORT, supra note 267, at 3.
354. Cf sources cited supra note 330.
355. 1993 DOJ REPORT, supra note 267, at 3.
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adjusted forward the timing for EAJA filing in Social Security cases and Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims cases, causing a temporary surge in cases in 1994.356
The increase in reported payouts was almost entirely due to Social Security cases,
especially given that the absolute increase in cases from any other agency besides
HHS was miniscule: in 1994 there were precisely fifty 28 U.S.C. § 2412
applications for every agency except HHS (2206), and Veterans' Affairs (145), as
compared to forty-one 28 U.S.C. § 2412 applications for each agency except HHS
(222) in 1993.357 Moreover, the average EAJA payout in 1994 was $3733, the
second lowest average on record, again suggesting that the bulk of the increase was
a multitude of small-award cases from HHS. 358
Naturally, an uptick in Social Security cases was hardly likely to trouble
Congress. It is hard to select a more sympathetic case than an elderly or disabled
person denied Social Security benefits without a substantial justification on the
government's part in doing so (keep in mind that that the latter is a requirement for
an EAJA award). And given that Social Security recipients for the most part
represent a powerful, actively voting bloc, Congress would likely view EAJA
payments to them as not only inexpensive, but also in large part fulfilling the intent
of EAJA: providing recompense for those wronged by government activity who
likely would not be able to afford a lawyer to collect on these claims.
But there is considerable evidence that the costs of EAJA have climbed in
other, less desirable, ways. The author of this paper conducted a study on a small
subset of twenty frequent environmental litigants. The study, which examined cases
marked as "closed" by the PACER system in a one-year span from September 1,
2009 to August 31, 2010, found that EAJA payments to those groups alone had at
least equaled $5.8 million in that period.359 Most of those awards were directed
against the Department of Interior, specifically FWS and the Bureau of
Reclamation. This payout dwarfs the total payout to every agency in every other
year from 1982-1994 with the sole exception of Social Security cases in 1994, for
the reasons discussed above. 360 A similar study examining tax returns from the
same twenty groups found the average yearly attorneys' fees claimed by those
groups to be $9.1 million.361
More precise information regarding the costs to specific agencies of EAJA is
sparse, but suggestive. For instance, a study by Michael J. Mortimer and Robert W.
Malmsheimer of litigation against the Forest Service from 1999 to 2005 found that
the Forest Service had paid out a total of at least $6,137,583,362 at an average
356. Id.; see also discussion supra p. 32-33.
357. 1993 DOJ REPORT, supra note 267, at 3.
358. Cf id.
359. Memorandum from Miguel Dickson & Chris Segal, PACER Search Results 2-3 (July 25, 2011) (on
file with University of Notre Dame Law School Journal of Legislation). Of course, this figure only
encompasses court awards under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and does not include agency awards under 5 U.S.C. § 504.
360. Cf sources cited supra note 330.
361. See Memorandum from Chris Segal, 990 Search Results (July 11, 2011) (on file with University of
Notre Dame Law School Journal of Legislation).
362. Michael J. Mortimer & Robert W. Malmsheimer, The Equal Access to Justice Act and US Forest
Service Land Management: Incentives to Litigate?, 109 J. FORESTRY 352, 354 (Sept., 2011).
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payout per year of $876,798.363 The results corroborated the findings of Lauren B.
Stull regarding the incentives for various groups to sue the Forest Service.364 And
again, one must keep in mind that this is a payout from one agency within one
department in the federal government, while the EAJA figures quoted in the
paragraphs above were for the entire federal government. These costs of course do
not factor in the Forest Service's costs in preparing for and conducting litigation.
No doubt, their effectiveness and morale have been compromised by dealing with
so much litigation so regularly.36 5
The attorneys' fees awarded under EAJA represent only one part of the total
costs of EAJA to the American taxpayer. The personnel costs of preparing for
litigation through pleadings and discovery, submitting evidence to administrative or
judicial proceedings, employees being deposed, and reanalyzing and rewriting
environmental impact statements and biological opinions found inadequate by the
courts have been elusive costs to quantify. However the Government
Accountability Office is now conducting a study of overall EAJA costs. 366 Their
first report investigating the Environmental Protection Agency revealed that from
FY 1995-2010, a total of 2,500 environmental cases (155 per year) were filed
against EPA, each defended by the Department of Justice's Environment and
Natural Resources Division. From 1998-2010, DOJ spent $43 million to defend
EPA cases, or $3.3 million annually. 367 The attorneys' fee awards paid out by DOJ
on behalf of EPA totaled approximately $1.8 million.368 Thus, for every $1.00 paid
out in fee awards, DOJ alone spends $1.83 in personnel and administrative costs.
The related internal costs at EPA remain un-quantified.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has been an even more visible and
dramatic victim of excessive litigation, much of it eligible for EAJA. Recall the
kinds of cases discussed in Section B in which a statutory deadline of some sort or
another was missed. The APA allows a party to bring suit to "compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed."369 Since the Endangered Species
Act sets very specific and inflexible deadlines to respond to petitions regarding
species status,370 FWS is often in the position of missing those deadlines. This is
363. Id.
364. Lauren B. Stull, The Equal Access to Justice Act and Federal Land Management: Incentives to
Litigate? (June 29, 2007) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) (on
file with University of Notre Dame Law School Journal of Legislation).
365. Thomas, supra note 315.
366. E.g. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO- 11-650, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: CASES
AGAINST EPA AND ASSOCIATED COSTS OVER TIME (2011). Additional reports on EAJA expenditures are
expected in the near future.
367. Id. at 19.
368. Id.
369. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006).
370. Under the Endangered Species Act, FWS has three classification levels to identify and designate
"endangered species": candidate, threatened or endangered. Candidate species are listed by FWS's own
initiative through its annual Candidate Notice of Review (CNOR) process. Warranted-but-precluded by higher
priority findings become resubmitted petitions one year from the date of the finding following the same
CNOR process, and remain on the candidate list and reviewed annually. Petitions by third party individuals or
organizations outside FWS to secure classifying species as threatened or endangered require that FWS make
an initial finding within ninety days as to whether the petition presents substantial scientific or commercial
50 [Vol. 38: 1
Reforming the Equal Access to Justice Act
especially the case in recent years, as groups such as the Center for Biological
Diversity have stepped up the pace of petition listing requests.
Consider, for instance, that from 1998 to 2003, the FWS had petitions to list as
endangered 13, 16, 35, 15, 25, and 21 species respectively, 371 and that from 2003 to
2010 that workload was 298 (with one petition for 225 species), 11, 23, 695 (with a
petition for 206 species, and another for 475), 56, 63, and 432 (with a petition for
404 species) respectively.372 FWS has not had proportionally large budget
increases, so it is doubtful it can routinely deal with five times as much work as in
earlier years, let alone in some cases up to fifty times as much work. Moreover,
consider that in FWS's estimation, in 2010 it cost on average $345,000 to publish a
proposed rule regarding a given species with a critical habitat finding. 373 With a
single petition for 225, 206, 475, or 404 species, it's clear that FWS will not be able
to comply in a timely fashion, and then any group will be free to sue under the APA
and recover fees for doing so from EAJA.
This problem has become so intractable that FWS has engaged in a multidistrict
litigation settlement with its two most persistent aggressors, the Center for
Biological Diversity, and WildEarth Guardians (WEG). 374 The multidistrict
litigation with WEG was based on thirteen outstanding suits against the defendants
filed in 2009 and 2010 in six different federal district courts scattered across the
country. Each case was based on FWS missing either a ninety-day or twelve-month
statutory deadline to make a threatened or endangered finding on twenty-three
different species. The thirteen cases had been all consolidated as multidistrict
litigation and moved to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 375 The
WildEarth Guardians Settlement Agreement for these thirteen consolidated cases
however extended its reach further by taking judicial notice, recognizing and
incorporating the existence of 251 identified candidate species that had been
awaiting publication of a proposed rule by the FWS for "long periods of time" and
information indicating that the petitioned action may be warranted. If a petitioned action is found to present
substantial information indicating the petitioned action may be warranted, the Secretary of Interior must
within twelve months of the date of the petition make a finding as to whether the petitioned action is
warranted, not warranted, or warranted but precluded by higher priority action ("warranted-but-precluded"). If
warranted, FWS must publish in the Federal Register a proposed regulation to implement the listing
("Proposed Rule").
Within twelve months after publishing the Proposed Rule, FWS is required to publish a final regulation either
placing the species at issue and its related critical habitat needed for survival on the threatened or endangered
list, withdraw the earlier Proposed Rule, or notice the invocation of a six-month extension to make its
determination. FWS also has the authority to list species on an emergency basis without regard to the petition
or candidate process when they determine there is a significant risk to the well-being of any species simply by
publishing such a determination by regulation in the Federal Register.
371. Letter from Office ofESA Litigation, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. to author (Aug. 9, 2011) (on file
with University of Notre Dame Law School Journal of Legislation).
372. Id.
373. Id.; Cf Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 78094, 78141 (proposed Dec. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17) (listing median costs to prepare various findings and rules); Endangered and Threatened
Wildlife and Plants: 12-Month Finding on a Petition to List the Sonoran Population of the Desert Tortoise as
Endangered or Threatened.
374. See In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig. 270 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
375. Id. (at Docket); see also Certified True Copy of Conditional Transfer Order, id.
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were without the legal protection of the ESA.376 Even FWS admitted "many of
these 251 candidate species have been on the candidate list for more than 10
years." 377 The WEG Settlement Agreement goes even further by taking judicial
notice of five other pending cases the plaintiff and others had filed challenging the
merits of five warranted-but-precluded findings made by FWS.378 The Settlement
Agreement then recognizes and incorporates as Exhibit A, thirty-five outstanding
settlement agreements and court orders from unrelated cases that require the action
of multiple petition findings, final listing regulations and critical habitat
determinations over which twelve different federal district courts still retain
jurisdiction. 3 Finally, the WEG Settlement Agreement lists FWS's entire species
listing and critical habitat work plan for FY 2011 and 2012 and identifies over 880
species and internal priorities for FWS, the order in which their staff will address
each, establishes yearly incremental deadlines for the staff, and commits FWS to
dedicating "substantially all of the resources in the Listing Program" to accomplish
the many tasks prescribed by the settlement agreement by September 30, 2016.380
Notably, FWS's admission in one pleading says there are over 851 species
requiring ninety-day and twelve-month petition findings.3 8'
The agreement anticipates this global settlement and work plan will "prevent
the filing of an even greater amount of anticipated litigation, is in the public
interest, and is an appropriate way to resolve the disputes [with others]." 382 The
work plan moreover is intended to provide FWS an orderly administration of its
Listing Program, maintain a balanced output of petition findings and designations,
and reduce the number of candidate species. Plaintiff WildEarth Guardians
agreed not to petition for any new listings beyond ten per year prior to September
30, 2016,384 or file any further litigation until after March 31, 2017, with multiple
exceptions and exemptions, and not actively solicit others to do so.3s However, the
settlement agreement explicitly does "not preclude Guardians from providing
biological information concerning the imperilment of species to other organizations
or individuals, if requested."386
The Center for Biological Diversity's (CBD) settlement agreement is separate
but complementary to the WEG agreement, and gives CBD separate rights to
enforce certain deadlines in the WEG agreement.387 Under the agreement, the court
376. See Joint Motion For Approval of Settlement Agreement and Order of Dismissal of Guardians'
Claims, at 9 In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig. 270 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2010) [hereinafter
Motion and Order of Guardians' Claims].
377. See id at 2.
378. See id at 11.
379. See id. at 19-20.
380. See id at 9, 23-26.
381. Cf id. at 2.
382. Id. at 6.
383. Id. at 10.
384. See id
385. See id at 9.
386. Id.
387. See Joint Motion For Approval of Settlement Agreement and Order of Dismissal of the Center's
Claims, at 7 In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig. 270 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
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took judicial notice of three lawsuits in which CBD is a co-plaintiff which will be
dismissed, or they will withdraw from, and one wherein CBD is the sole plaintiff
which will be voluntarily dismissed, all in four separate federal district courts. By
September 30, 2011, FWS is required to issue ninety-day findings for 477 species,
and twelve-month findings for eleven species.388 Prior to September 30, 2017, FWS
is required to publish a proposed rule or a non-warranted finding in the Federal
Register for thirty-two candidate species and eight non-candidate species.389 When
the 1,659 prescribed actions of species and critical habitat determinations from both
settlement agreements are combined, this is what FWS's action plan calls for: by
the end of FY2011 (September 30, 2011), 1,182 determinations; by FY 2012, 194
determinations; by FY 2013, 144 determinations; by FY 2014, 37 determinations;
by FY 2015, 47 determinations; by FY 2016, 54 determinations; by FY 2017, 1
determination. 390 Moreover, the fifty-two determinations prescribed in the thirty-
five outstanding but unrelated settlement agreements and court orders must be
severally addressed within this same timeframe.
In sum, FWS now has no agency flexibility whatsoever; no discretion. Its work
schedule and priorities have been set by court order, and it is reporting not only to
the court but to private plaintiffs. All of this was triggered because FWS missed
deadlines due to delays caused by the plaintiffs' excessive litigiousness. In fact,
FWS even admits that meeting these deadlines will take "substantially all of the
resources in the Listing Program."
The story of the ramifications and impact of these two settlement agreements
on the federal government and American taxpayers does not end with just the
domination of FWS by outside parties, and the effective hijacking of its budget and
staff. Both settlement agreements of course specify that the plaintiffs are
"prevailing part[ies]," and are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs in
this consolidated case, and in each of the thirteen cases that were severally
consolidated into this case, as are each of the co-plaintiffs in each of the
consolidated cases. 391 In the primary consolidated case, WildEarth Guardians
received attorneys' fees of $167,602392 and the Center for Biological Diversity
received attorneys' fees of $128,158. 393 Fees in related cases may yet be awarded in
the future. Funding for these multiple attorneys' fees will come directly from the
Judgment Fund and EAJA, as determined by the guidelines of the Department of
Justice which typically splits them by order of how much was subject to ESA fee-
shifting, followed by EAJA fee-shifting. 394
EAJA abuse then covers a remarkably wide range of activity: from individual
388. Id. at 5.
389. See id. at 7.
390. Compare id., with Motion and Order of Guardians' Claims, supra note 376.
391. Motion and Order of Guardians' Claims at 7.
392. Id. at Stipulation to Resolve WildEarth Guardians' Claims for Attorneys' Fees and Order, 2.
393. Id. at Stipulation to Resolve Center for Biological Diversity's Claims for Attorneys' Fees and Order,
2.
394. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Payment of Attorney's Fees in Litigation Involving Successful Challenges
to Federal Agency Action Arising Under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Citizen-Suit Provisions of
the Endangered Species Act (2000).
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payouts of millions of dollars in attorneys' fees in single cases, to the
encouragement of repeat or derivative litigation, to the evasion of the statutory cap,
and even to massive flotillas of lawsuits intended to entirely capture and restructure
the work of an entire agency. Though the section above has shown some of these
costs, one should recall these are lower-bound estimates, and there are always costs
to the government, usually un-quantified, 395 including litigation costs to the
Department of Justice396 and lost efficiency and morale within the targeted
agencies.
IV. EFFORTS AT REFORM
"Reform!" has oft been a rallying cry for the Congress, and issues surrounding
EAJA are no exception. Part 2 of this article discussed some of the ways EAJA has
been amended or altered by both Congress and courts. Unsurprisingly, many
familiar with the story of abuse told in Part 3 believe it is imperative that EAJA be
amended again. Over the years, many others have thought EAJA should be
amended, in some cases for the exact same reasons. This Part explores past
unsuccessful efforts at reform, before turning to the present.
Section A of this Part focuses on the House Small Business Committee's
attempt to amend EAJA in 1981 to remove the 501(c)(3) exception, discussed
earlier in Part 2.B. Section B revisits the legislative history of the 1985 amendments
to EAJA, focusing on unsuccessful changes. Section C explores a 1992 attempt to
limit EAJA awards strictly to the hourly cap. Section D examines a series of
proposals, floated between 1997 and 2006, to make EAJA recovery automatic in
suits against EPA and OSHA. Section E mentions an attempt, in 2010, to reinstitute
tracking of payments. Finally, Section F discusses the Government Litigation
Savings Act of 2011 (GLSA), currently pending before Congress. It examines the
stated reasons for the introduction of the legislation and critically evaluates the
changes the legislation would make. Ultimately, it includes suggestions for
additional provisions that Congress could consider, drawn from the history of
EAJA as previously outlined.
A. 1981: The House Small Business Committee's Attempt to Limit the
501(c) (3) Exception
EAJA went through many alterations in the years it spent in committee between
1975 and 1980, and again between 1981 and 1985. Many of the changes were
nuanced, such as the selection of the term "substantially justified," 397 and others
were nearly invisible, such as the initial addition of the 501(c)(3) exception. 398
395. But see infra note 396.
396. Cf U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 366, at 19 (citing an average figure of $3.3
million per year to defend EPA from lawsuits). For further discussion of the incidental costs of EAJA
litigation, see supra pp. 49-50.
397. See discussion supra p. 27.
398. See discussion supra p. 29-32.
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But the addition of the 501(c)(3) exception did not stay invisible. On the
contrary, it was the subject of a failed amendment campaign that played out in 1981
and 1982. The 501(c)(3) exception first appeared on September 26, 1980, in the
House Committee on the Judiciary Report 96-1418 accompanying their review of
S. 265, and it became part of the final law just five days later, on October 1, 1980.
After the election of 1980 and during budget negotiations in the spring of 1981, the
House Small Business Committee took umbrage at this insertion, as well as the
deletion of the requirement that an applicant have a "direct and personal" injury in
order to recover. 399 The Committee launched a strenuous effort to amend EAJA
back to its original intent, ultimately without success. Its proposed amendments
(part of H.R. 2998) were characterized as "technical changes" intended to amend
EAJA "to more closely reflect the Committee's intent for H.R. 6429 as ordered
reported" a year earlier.400 In its own words:
The bill's amendment to Title II of Public Law 96-481 [EAJA] would
return the Equal Access to Justice Act to a form similar to that agreed upon
by the House Small Business Committee in May of last year. Specifically,
the amendment restricts the use of the Act to business owners and
individuals who prevail in regulatory or judicial disputes with the Federal
Government ... 401
The proposed amendment would have struck out any reference to 501(c)(3)
organizations and their exemption from the net-worth cap.
As the amendment was drafted, 501(c)(3)s would also be excluded by another
qualifying standard inserted in the amendment. Rather than reinsert the "direct and
personal interest" language to have standing to access funds utilizing EAJA, the
House Small Business Committee took a different approach. The 1981 amendment
required that the:
Prevailing party would have suffered a pecuniary loss in excess of $500 in his
individual capacity and not as a member or representative of an organization or
group; or, the prevailing party was engaged in carrying on a trade or business for
profit where the amount in controversy is in excess of $500 ... and was directly
related to the conduct of such trade or business.4 02
Clearly, this would eliminate non-profit organizations. The House Small
Business Committee's intent that EAJA was to exclude 501(c)(3) organizations and
only serve private citizens and small businesses was again made clear. The House
approved the Small Business Committee's proposed amendments to EAJA, but the
Senate rejected them.
In 1982, during oversight hearings on "Implementation of the Equal Access to
Justice Act," the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
399. For a discussion of the deletion of the direct and personal interest, see supra p. 29.
400. See H.R. REP.NO.97-150, at 58 (1981).
401. See id. at 64.
402. See id. at 11.
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Liberties, and the Administration of Justice (chaired by Robert W. Kastenmeier (D-
WI)) asserted primary jurisdiction over the bill and rejected the House Small
Business Committee's proposed amendments because it claimed it had never seen
the amendments. 403 The Subcommittee on Agency Administration of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary also examined EAJA in 1982,404 but not the proposed
amendments, and nothing more ever came of it. However, the House Small
Business Committee's hearings and reports document and preserve for history its
perception that it was bypassed and ignored by its own Judiciary Committee and the
Joint Senate and House Conference Committee, because EAJA was Title II in a
small business bill over which the House Small Business Committee considered it
had jurisdiction. After 1982, the only recorded discussion that occurred in the
Congress on the 501(c)(3) issue was in a Senate hearing on April 14, 1983405
during consideration of reauthorizing EAJA. At that hearing, the Washington Legal
Foundation again advocated putting the same net-worth limitations on 501(c)(3)s
that applied to small businesses.406 Of course, the 501(c)(3) exception has returned
to the spotlight in the present Congress, but that story is told in Section 4F.
B. 1980-1985: Other Failed Reform Efforts
Over the years there have been several particularly noteworthy reform
proposals. The amendment process leading up to the reauthorization of EAJA in
1985 was a particularly interesting period, with no fewer than eight different
committee hearings (some spanning multiple days) and reports in the House and
Senate. Of the many alterations debated in these proceedings, three failed
amendments stand out as measures that had the potential to dramatically reduce the
payment of EAJA attorneys' fees by the government, particularly in cases where
excessive fees are sought or where the availability of fees drives the litigation.
Some context for these ideas can be found in the Reagan Administration's 1982
budget submission, which claimed that "a literal industry has arisen for attorneys
dependent on Federal fee awards." 407 Clearly, fee award reform was ripe for
discussion.
The earliest of these other EAJA proposals came from the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). OMB suggested that EAJA be amended to
require a petitioner to certify that if his or her EAJA application were denied, his or
403. See Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act, supra note 185, at 1.
404. Equal Access to Justice: Hearing on the Equal Access to Justice Act Before the Subcomm. on
Agency Admin. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982).
405. Reauthorization of Equal Access to Justice Act: Oversight Hearing to Extend the Authorization of
the Equal Access to Justice Act, S. 919 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. (1983) [hereinafter Reauthorization ofEqual Access to Justice Act].
406. See id at 154, 165 (statements of Michael P. McDonald).
407. Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act, supra note 185, at 22 (comment by Congressman
Barney Frank). President Reagan was proposing an EAJA-type cap for all attorneys' fees statutes. Id. at 297.
The point nonetheless stands, that the Administration felt that the government was paying too much in
attorneys' fees.
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her attorney would still receive payment.408 According to OMB, "this amendment
will restrict contingency fee litigations against the Federal Government brought by
and on behalf of attorneys whose notational clients bear no litigation risks or costs,
and who are merely the means by which attorneys satisfy nominal standing
requirements." 409 The Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary discussed this
proposal with universal disapproval: Representative Frank characterized it as
"inequitable," 410 and Sara-Ann Determan (testifying on behalf of the American Bar
Association) objected to the suggestion that lawyers who represent poor persons
were in fact representing their own political views. 411 The Alliance for Justice
added its disapproval,412 and the amendment was swiftly dropped.
The other two proposals of interest both came from the Department of Justice.
The first is very faint in the legislative record, but apparently the Department
suggested that there be an amendment requiring that fees not be disproportionate to
the amount in controversy.413 Stephen L. Babcock, testifying on behalf of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, characterized this amendment as
"directly contrary to the purpose of the act" 414 and the suggestion was dropped.
However, it is easy to see that if adopted, this amendment would have limited major
EAJA awards to significant cases, as well as implicitly tied awards to direct
monetary interests.
The Department's other proposal was for a punitive amendment, which would
have required courts to "deny all fees if . .. the initial amount sought [is found] to
be unreasonably high or, perhaps, substantially unjustified." 415 This proposal was
never seriously taken up by Congress, but if adopted, it would undoubtedly have
had a profound effect. Huge numbers of EAJA petitions are granted but largely
reduced from the initial request, and the knowledge that an unreasonable initial fee
request could result in a total denial of fees would reduce the size of initial requests,
certainly making the use of judicial resources in EAJA cases more economical and
perhaps reducing some of the huge fee awards that are still routinely seen.
Finally, two comments merit mention. In 1984, the Department of Justice
expressed concern about "the use of so-called multiplier factors in awarding fees,"
which increased fee awards above the $75 an hour cap that was then part of
EAJA.416 In a written statement, Carolyn B. Kuhl, a Deputy Assistant Attorney
General in the Civil Division, explained that the use of cost multipliers was
408. Id. at 8. (comment by Congressman Barney Frank).
409. Id. at 20 (testimony of Sara-Ann Determan quoting OMB).
410. Id. (comment by Congressman Barney Frank).
411. Id (testimony of Sara-Ann Determan).
412. Id. at 37-38 (testimony of Nan Aron).
413. Reauthorization of Equal Access to Justice Act, supra note 405, at 10 (comment of Senator Charles
E. Grassley).
414. Id. (testimony of Stephen L. Babcock).
415. Id. at 33 (prepared statement of J. Paul McGrath).
416. Equal Access to Justice Act Amendments: Hearing on H.R. 5059 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Admin. ofJustice ofthe H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 21 (1984) (testimony
of Carolyn B. Kuhl).
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"contrary" to the fee cap, encouraged "excessive free requests and prolonged
litigation," and damaged the public perception of EAJA. 417 At the same hearing, the
Department submitted a copy of a memorandum that warned that "[i]t is
questionable whether the Equal Access to Justice Act has done anything for its
presumed beneficiaries, while it is certain that it has helped public interest legal
groups finance their challenges to the deregulatory efforts of the
Administration." 418 No amendment ever came of the Department's concerns, but in
1984 they eerily foreshadowed more recent developments.
C. 1992: The Access to Justice Act of 1992
1992 saw an important change to EAJA, with the adoption of the Federal
Courts Administration Act of 1992 applying EAJA to cases before the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims.419 But another EAJA reform was proposed as well:
The Access to Justice Act of 1992.420 The bill, which was introduced in both the
House and Senate and referred to committees but never further acted upon, was an
omnibus bill addressing several issues relating to litigation involving the federal
government. These included, inter alia, a broad provision meant to build upon
EAJA by allowing the United States to proactively enter into agreements for
attorneys' fees in a variety of situations,421 and also an amendment to EAJA
itself.422 The amendment would have removed the "special factor" exception from
EAJA's statutory cap on hourly rates and codified the "cost of living" exception by
pegging it to the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers.423 If adopted,
this reform measure might have significantly limited the abuse chronicled in Part
3.A.424 Unfortunately it was not adopted, and the Congressional Record contains no
discussion, debate, or explanation of why.
D. 199 7-2006: Modifying EAJA in Defense of Small Business
Throughout the period 1997-2006, Congress considered several measures to
modify EAJA to make it even more small-business friendly. Two of these bills
aimed directly at making EAJA easier to use against OSHA and NLRB, agencies
417. Id. at 26 (prepared statement of Carolyn B. Kuhl).
418. Id. at 153 (Appendix I(F): Department of Justice Memorandum Recommending the President not
Approve Legislation Reauthorizing the Equal Access to Justice Act); see also Stephen Edward Blackman,
Note, Bad Faith and the EAJA: A Proposal for Strict Scrutiny of Government Fee Litigation Under the EAJA,
20 ENVTL. L. 975, 988 (1990). The American Enterprise Institute expressed the same concerns, albeit outside
of the Hearing context. Perspective, The Private Attorney General Industry: Doing Well by Doing Good,
REGULATION, May-June 1982, at 5, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv6n3/v6n3-2.pdf
419. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 506, 106 Stat. at 4513 (1992).
420. The Access to Justice Act of 1992, H.R. 4155, 102d Cong. (1992); The Access to Justice Act of
1992, S. 2180, 102d Cong. (1992).
421. Id. at § 6.
422. Id. at § 4.
423. Id.
424. See supra p. 54-56.
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whose overreach had been part of the original impetus behind EAJA. The third was
a systematic EAJA reform bill which contained many of the same good ideas that
the OSHA and NLRB bills had, and which in other important respects presaged
measures included in the current GLSA. However, it also included some fairly bad
ideas that were only plausible because the extent of EAJA's abuses were hidden
and only beginning to spiral out of control during that time.
1. 1997-1999: The Fair Access to Indemnity and Reimbursement Act (FAIR Act)
In late 1997, House Bill 2449 and Senate Bill 1684 were introduced into the
House and Senate, respectively. These bills were known as the "Fair Access to
Indemnity and Reimbursement Act" (FAIR Act). The animating idea behind the
FAIR Act was simple and well-stated in the "Findings and Purpose" section of the
bill, so it is simply quoted below:
(a) FINDINGS- The Congress finds as follows:
(1) Certain small businesses and labor organizations are at a great
disadvantage in terms of expertise and resources when facing actions
brought by the National Labor Relations Board.
(2) The attempt to "level the playing field" for small businesses and
labor organizations by means of the Equal Access to Justice Act has proven
ineffective and has been underutilized by these small entities in their
actions before the National Labor Relations Board.
(3) The greater expertise and resources of the National Labor
Relations Board as compared with those of small businesses and labor
organizations necessitate a standard that awards fees and costs to certain
small entities when they prevail against the National Labor Relations
Board.
(b) PURPOSE-It is the purpose of this Act-
(1) to ensure that certain small businesses and labor organizations will
not be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against, actions
brought against them by the National Labor Relations Board because of the
expense involved in securing vindication of their rights;
(2) to reduce the disparity in resources and expertise between certain
small businesses and labor organizations and the National Labor Relations
Board; and
(3) to make the National Labor Relations Board more accountable for
its enforcement actions against certain small businesses and labor
organizations by awarding fees and costs to these entities when they prevail
against the National Labor Relations Board. 425
425. Fair Access to Indemnity and Reimbursement Act of 1997, H.R. 2449, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Fair
Access to Indemnity and Reimbursement Act of 1997, S. 1684, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
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The obvious question is how the FAIR Act would improve on EAJA, and that
question is simple to answer. The bill would have modified the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) by adding in two sections. The first one, entitled
"Administrative Proceedings" mandated that "[a]n employer who, or a labor
organization that - (1) is the prevailing party in an adversary adjudication
conducted by the Board under this or any other Act, and (2) had not more than 100
employees and a net worth of not more than $1,400,000 at the time the adversary
adjudication was initiated" automatically wins fees and other expenses under
"section 504 of title 5, United States Code" (EAJA's administrative section), "but
without regard to whether the position of the Board was substantially justified or
special circumstances make an award unjust." 426 So the basic EAJA mechanism
was to be retained, but recovery was to be automatic for a prevailing party,
regardless of whether NLRB was justified or whether there were any special
circumstances. Similarly, the second "Court Proceedings" section would have
awarded fees under section 2412(d) of title 28 (EAJA's courts section), with the
same exemptions.
In May 1999, a modified version came out of the Subcommittee on Employer-
Employee Relations of the House Education and the Workforce Committee. That
bill, still called the FAIR Act, was only slightly different: in each case where NLRB
was mentioned, parallel mention was made of OSHA.427 Thus, if a party were to
prevail against OSHA either in its administrative process or in court, attorneys' fees
recovery and costs against it would likewise be automatic.
Though neither bill was passed, several things about the attempts are
noteworthy. First, Congress never lost track of the fact that EAJA was intended to
aid small businesses. Thus, even while ending the reporting in 1995, Congress still
was concerned that EAJA had not been as successful as desired, and continued to
look for ways to improve the legislation. Second, the choice of targets-OSHA and
NLRB-is significant: both agencies factored prominently into the discussions and
rhetoric surrounding the passage of EAJA. And third, Congress made the net worth
cap for qualifying for this automatic-recovery provision, i.e. $1.4 million,
significantly smaller than either the individual net worth cap for EAJA ($2 million),
or the organizational net worth cap ($7 million), and similarly adjusted the
maximum number of employees to be eligible from 500 in EAJA down to 100 in
the FAIR Act.428 Thus, Congress's changes were entirely small-business oriented:
an automatic recovery mechanism aimed at two often anti-small-business agencies,
with even more tightly constrained financial eligibility requirements than those in
EAJA.
426. H.R. 2449 § 3 (internal quotation marks omitted); S. 1684 § 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
427. Fair Access to Indemnity and Reimbursement Act of 1999, H.R. 1987, 106th Cong. (1999); Fair
Access to Indemnity and Reimbursement Act of 1999, S. 1158, 106th Cong. (1999).
428. H.R. 1987, §§ 3, 5; S. 1158, §§ 3, 5.
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2. 2003-2005: The Occupational Safety and Health Fairness Act
Concern with OSHA did not fade from Congress' agenda after the failure of the
FAIR Act. A considerably more complex and hands-on piece of legislation, the
Occupational Safety and Health Fairness Act [hereinafter the "OSHA Fair Act"]
was introduced in 2003.429 Though many of the bill's provisions would take this
article adrift into areas of labor law that have little to do with EAJA, section 6 of the
OSHA Fair Act was quite similar to the FAIR Act discussed in the subsection
above. It would have modified OSHA by adding in a fee-award provision for
administrative proceedings430 and for judicial proceedings.431 Like the FAIR Act,
these sections of the OSHA Fair Act removed the substantial justification defense
and the special circumstances defense; these sections also limited this streamlined
recovery process to groups with no more than 100 employees and $1.5 million in
net worth. The bill came up again in 2005, with substantively identical
provisions. 4 32
3. 2003-2006: The Equal Access to Justice Reform Act
Perhaps the most interesting and incisive reform legislation to concern EAJA
before the GLSA was the sequence of bills spanning from 2003 to 2006, named the
Equal Access to Justice Reform Act (EAJRA), first introduced in 2003.433 Unlike
the FAIR Act and the OSHA Fair Act, both of which aimed to modify EAJA solely
in the context of proceedings against NLRB and/or OSHA, EAJRA instead sought
to reform the entire EAJA mechanism. The bill had an unusually strong findings
section:
(a) FINDINGS- The Congress finds that-
(1) the Equal Access to Justice Act (Public Law 96-48 1; 94 Stat. 2325
et seq.) (in this section referred to as "EAJA") was intended to make the
justice system more accessible to individuals of modest means, small
businesses, and nonprofit organizations (in this section collectively referred
to as "small parties") through limited recovery of their attorneys' fees when
they prevail in disputes with the Federal Government;
(2) although EAJA has succeeded, at modest cost, in improving access
to the justice system for small parties, EAJA retains formidable barriers to
attorneys' fees recovery (even for small parties that completely prevail
against the Government), as well as inefficient and costly mechanisms for
determining the fees recovery;
429. Occupational Safety and Health Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1583, 108th Cong. (2003).
430. Id. at §§ 6,32(a).
431. Id. at § 32(b).
432. Occupational Safety Fairness Act of 2005, S. 2006, 109th Cong. (2005).
433. Equal Access to Justice Reform Act of 2003, H.R. 2282, 108th Cong. (2003). It was introduced
again in 2005, without significant changes. Equal Access to Justice Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 435, S. 2017,
109th Cong. (2005); Equal Access to Justice Reform Act of 2005, S. 2017, 109th Cong. (2005).
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(3) among the barriers retained by EAJA are-
(A) EAJA's "substantial justification defense", whereby the
Government can deny attorneys' fees recovery to prevailing small parties if
the Government can show that its position, although proven illegal, was not
abusive or entirely unreasonable;
(B) EAJA's hourly rate cap on attorneys' fees of $125, which is well
below the market rate for competent legal services in many legal markets
(especially for complex and high-risk litigation against the Federal
Government) and thus prevents fair reimbursement of attorneys' fees for
small parties and discourages competent counsel from undertaking
meritorious cases on a contingency or reduced-fee basis; and
(C) EAJA's outdated small business eligibility requirements, which
have not increased or indexed for inflation the net worth threshold of
$7,000,000 established in 1985;
(4) among the inefficiencies retained by EAJA are-
(A) EAJA's substantial justification defense, which initiates collateral
litigation over attorneys' fees recovery that both consumes significant
Federal resources and prolongs the time, expense, and risk of pursuing fees
recovery to the prevailing small party;
(B) EAJA's omission of any mechanism (such as the offer in
compromise feature of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68) that would
apply after a small party has prevailed on the merits of its claim to
encourage both sides to reach a prompt and reasonable settlement of
attorneys' fees;
(C) EAJA's failure to create an educational and technical assistance
function within an appropriate agency to facilitate more efficient use,
settlement, and payment of claims under EAJA; and
(D) EAJA's failure to reassign Congressional reporting obligations to
an appropriate, existing agency (EAJA lodges annual Congressional
reporting with the Administrative Conference of the United States, an
agency which ceased to exist in 1995);
(5) none of these barriers or inefficiencies exists in the primary
Federal fee-shifting statute applicable to State and local governments,
Revised Statutes section 722 (42 U.S.C. 1988(b)), resulting in-
(A) an unequal level of accountability to Federal law among
governments in the United States (shielding the Federal Government to a
greater degree than State and local governments from the consequences of
violating Federal law);
(B) an uneven playing field for small party victims of Federal law
violations (discouraging resistance to illegal action by the Federal
Government); and
(C) an inefficient use of Federal agency resources (burdening the
Federal budget);
(6) a further barrier and inefficiency is the practice of Federal agencies
of paying their EAJA liabilities from the General Treasury rather than their
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own agency budgets, relieving those agencies of the financial
consequences of their misconduct (i.e., EAJA liability) and burdening the
Federal budget unnecessarily;
(7) it is in the national interest to remove these barriers and
inefficiencies for small parties, particularly small business owners,
involved in disputes with the Federal Government in order to develop
sound policies relative to the national economy in which small businesses
play a significant and strategic role; and
(8) the removal of these barriers and inefficiencies is essential to-
(A) equalize the level of accountability to Federal law among
governments in the United States;
(B) discourage marginal or abusive Federal enforcement actions
directed at small parties;
(C) stop the practice of paying EAJA liabilities from the General
Treasury, which has insulated agencies from the financial consequences of
their misconduct and burdened the Federal budget unnecessarily;
(D) refine and improve Federal policies through adjudication;
(E) promote a fair and cost-effective process for prompt settlement
and payment of attorneys' fees claims; and
(F) provide a fairer opportunity for full participation by small
businesses in the free enterprise system, further increasing the economic
vitality of the Nation. 434
The Congressional analysis of EAJA encapsulated in this section in many ways
parallels this article's analysis. Thus, for instance, Congress approved of the fact
that EAJA has mostly "succeeded, at modest cost, in improving access to the justice
system for small parties," though noting it has not been perfectly successful. 435
Congress noted with disapproval the absence of reporting mechanisms, and
highlighted the problems with the reimbursement-payment system, and the fact that
payments are often being made out of the Judgment Fund instead of agencies' own
budgets, as originally intended. 436
EAJRA, like the FAIR Act and the OSHA Fair Act above, would have
eliminated the substantial justification defense. Unlike the FAIR Act and the OSHA
Fair Act, however, Congress moved in the other direction with the net worth caps-
by raising them to $10 million for organizations.437 In one sense, this is an
understandable move on Congress's part: it relied on the earlier $7 million figure in
EAJA, and roughly adjusted it upwards for inflation and cost of living changes.
Nevertheless, this move came without Congress's awareness of the abuses of EAJA
detailed in Part 3, and so it is unsurprising that the net worth cap adjustment has in
434. H.R. 2282.
435. Id. § 2(a)(2).
436. Id. § 4(b)(1). Sadly, there were no hearings on the bill, so the basis for this finding is unknown.
However, it was confirmed in 2010 by testimony before the Subcommittee on Interior, Environment and
Related Agencies of the House Committee on Appropriations. See also discussion supra note 265.
437. H.R. 2282 § 4(b).
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recent times moved back in the constrictive direction in the GLSA. 4 38
EAJRA also would have legislatively overruled Buckhannon by changing the
definition of prevailing party in EAJA cases to include "catalyst" cases. As the
legislation itself defined it, "prevailing party" would have included "a party whose
pursuit of a non-frivolous claim or defense was a catalyst for a voluntary or
unilateral change in position by the opposing party that provides any significant
part of the relief sought."439 Again, one must consider the congressional intent here:
improving small business access to attorneys' fees. This provision would likely do
exactly that, but would have the unintended side effect of opening EAJA to even
more 501(c)(3) litigant abuse, since APA suits, ESA deadline suits and many other
similar purely procedural suits would also in many cases apparently be "catalyst
theory" winners. Of course, the emphasis here is on "apparently": there is little
accomplished in suing an agency because of a missed deadline, and then when the
agency later completes the action, claiming that the lawsuit was the catalyst, as
though it is fair to assume that the agency would have indefinitely ignored its legal
obligations. Certainly, that assumption should not anchor a potentially sizable
award of attorneys' fees.
In sum, while attempting to protect the same constituency (small business),
EAJRA took a different approach. This different approach was understandable
given the picture of EAJA activity available to Congress in the mid-2000's, but has
significant drawbacks because of the EAJA abuses outlined in Part 3, and so would
not be the best approach for EAJA reform.
E. 2010: The Open EAJA Act of 2010
2010 saw the beginning of a nascent reform movement that continues to the
present. In March of 2010, Representative Cynthia Lummis (R-WY) and Senator
John Ensign (R-NV) introduced the Open EAJA Act of 2010, H.R. 4717, S.
3122.440 The Open EAJA Act sought to reinstitute the tracking of EAJA payments
that had been abolished by the Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of
1995.441 In the findings section, the bill specifically cited the fact that since 1995,
"[p]ayments authorized by EAJA have continued every year without Congressional
oversight." 442 It sought to remedy this by requiring the Department of Justice to
report on EAJA awards in agency and court proceedings, 443 and requiring the
Government Accountability Office to audit awards since 1995.444 Despite the
presumptive appeal of this simple bill, it was not enacted.
438. See art 4.F.
439. H.R. 2282 § 5.
440. Equal Access to Justice Reform Act of 2010, H.R. 4717, 111th Cong. (2010); Equal Access to
Justice Reform Act of 2010, S. 3122, 111th Cong. (2010).
441. See discussion suprapp. 43.
442. H.R. 4717 § 2; S. 3122 § 2.
443. H.R. 4717 § 3; S. 3122 § 3.
444. H.R. 4717 § 4; S. 3122 § 4.
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F. 2011: The Government Litigation Savings Act of 2011
Today, the debate over whether or not EAJA should be amended has resumed.
On May 25, 2011, Representative Cynthia Lummis (R-WY) and Senator John
Barrasso (R-WY) introduced in the House and Senate, respectively, the
Government Litigation Savings Act of 2011" (H.R. 1996, S. 1061) (hereinafter
GLSA). In a joint press release, the lead sponsors explained that the legislation
"will reduce the taxpayer's burden to pay for attorney's fees" and "returns EAJA to
its original intent by instituting targeted reforms on who is eligible to receive EAJA
reimbursements, limiting repeated lawsuits, and reinstating tracking and reporting
requirements to make EAJA more transparent."446 The sponsors' rhetoric was
strong. Representative Lummis said:
When the government stopped tracking EAJA payments in 1995, it was a
dream come true for radical environmental groups. Lack of oversight has fueled the
fire for these groups to grind the work of land management and other federal
agencies to a halt-and it does so on the taxpayer's dime. Americans have
unwittingly funded these obstructionist political agendas for far too long at the
expense of individuals, small businesses, energy producers, farmers and ranchers
who must pay out of their own pocket to defend the federal government against
relentless litigation. 447
Senator Barrasso added:
For far too long, special interest groups have funded their ...
agenda[s] with Americans' hard earned taxpayer dollars. It's absolutely
absurd that Washington pays outside groups to repeatedly sue our
government. It's time to halt the endless cycle of reckless lawsuits and fix
this broken system. Our bill will protect taxpayer dollars and restore
accountability and transparency.448
Once enacted, the GLSA would make several amendments to EAJA. First, it
would specify that to qualify for an award, a group must have "a direct and personal
monetary interest in the adjudication, including because of [sic] personal injury,
property damage, or unpaid agency disbursement,"449 finally incorporating the
failed 1981 reforms discussed in Part 4.A. It would raise the hourly cap from $125
445. Government Litigation Savings Act, H.R. 1996, 112th Cong. (2011); Government Litigation
Savings Act, S. 1061, 112th Cong. (2011).
446. Press Release, Congressman Cynthia Lummis, Lummis, Barrasso Fight Activist Lawsuits (May 25,
2011), available at http://lummis.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentlD=243017 [hereinafter
Lummis Press Release]; Press Release, Senator John Barrasso, Lummis, Barrasso Fight Activist Lawsuits
(May 25, 2011), available at
http://barrasso.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecordid=2840
aae7-802a-23ad-41a5-83423df1c962&Region id=&Issue id= [hereinafter Barrasso Press Release].
447. Lummis Press Release, supra note 446; Barasso Press Release, supra note 446.
448. Lummis Press Release, supra note 446; Barasso Press Release, supra note 446.
449. H.R. 1996 § 2 (as referred to H. Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial and Admin. Law, July 11, 2011);
S. 1061 § 2 (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, May 25, 2011).
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to $175, but remove the provision allowing for cost of living and other modifiers,
instead automatically adjusting the cap to inflation, 450 as proposed in 1992 and
discussed in Part 4.C. It would expand the discretion of agencies and courts to
reduce fees by requiring them to reduce fees if a party "acted in an obdurate,
dilatory, mendacious, or oppressive manner, or in bad faith" and by requiring them
to deny fees that are intended to compensate supposedly "pro bono" work.451 it
would bar awards of over $200,000 in a single agency adjudication or court case,
and limit recovery by any one party to three such agency adjudications and three
such civil cases in each calendar year, unless "an award exceeding such limits is
required to avoid severe and unjust harm to the prevailing party."452 It would also
build upon the 2010 proposal discussed in Part 4.E and reinstitute tracking of EAJA
payments, including detailed information about the agency and officer or court and
judge making each award, as well as the basis for the finding that the position of the
United States was not substantially justified, and it would establish a public
database of awards. 453 Finally, it would require the Government Accountability
Office to survey awards made during the years from 1995 to the present.4 54
It seems clear that the intention of this legislation is, as Representative Lummis
and Senator Barrasso said, to restrict the types of cases discussed in Part 3 of this
article, while honoring the historic commitment to individual plaintiffs and small
businesses that defines EAJA. Based on the approach of the legislation, it seems
clear that the latter objective should be easily met. The permitted personal injury,
property damage, or non-payment categories encompass the vast majority of claims
individuals or businesses might bring, and the cap of $200,000 per claim is
sufficient for all but a handful of cases, especially considering that multiplied over
six claims (three administrative and three judicial) the absolute maximum is $1.2
million per year, and that's before the safety value of the language permitting an
"award exceeding such limits" if "required to avoid severe and unjust harm to the
prevailing party." The reporting changes seem designed simply to create
accountability. However, two changes could potentially raise red flags for the
groups the legislation is supposed to protect. The strict limit of $175 an hour and
the bar on recompense for "pro bono" work both could deter top private attorneys.
Notwithstanding the American Bar Association's commitment to pro bono work,455
there is the possibility of lucrative compensation after the fact,456 and the GLSA
would somewhat reduce that possibility.
450. H.R. 1996 § 2; S. 1061 § 2.
451. H.R. 1996 § 2; S. 1061 § 2.
452. H.R. 1996 § 2; S. 1061 § 2.
453. H.R. 1996 § 2; S. 1061 § 2.
454. H.R. 1996 § 3; S. 1061 § 3.
455. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 cmt. (2006).
456. Examples of pro bono attorneys seeking fees abound. E.g., Court of Appeals Protects Pro Bono
Attorneys'Fees; Tells Government Agencies Not to Expect An Automatic Break on Fees, Los ANGELES CIVIL
LITIGATION BLOG (May 7, 2011, 11:33 PM), http://lacivillitigation.wordpress.com/2011/05/07/court-of-
appeals-protects-pro-bono-attorneys-fees-tells-government-agencies-not-to-expect-an-automatic-break-on-
fees/; Martha Neil, Fuss Over Firm's $1.8 M 'Pro Bono' Fee, ABA JOURNAL: LAW NEWS Now (Sep, 17,
2007, 3:35 PM), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/fuss-over firms_18 _m pro bono fee/.
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Turning to the GLSA's promise of reducing abusive 501(c)(3) litigation, the
probable results are more mixed. In evaluating this issue, it's important to make a
distinction between the fact that the government pays the other party's fees through
EAJA and the cost of the environmental litigation itself. In their press release,
Lummis and Barrasso both indicated their outrage at the fact that taxpayers are
subsidizing groups that sue the government. But in fact, EAJA fees are only one
way in which this litigation is costly. It costs the government money to defend the
EAJA claim as well as the underlying case, 457 and litigation can "grind the work of
land management and other federal agencies to a halt," in Lummis' words, without
any EAJA payments at all. Indeed, many of the largest environmental cases are
brought under the Endangered Species Act, as several examples discussed in Part
3.C illustrated.
Professors Michael J. Mortimer and Robert W. Malmsheimer comment on this
issue in a recent article in the Journal of Forestry, evaluating the impact of EAJA on
the U.S. Forest Service.458 Evaluating the years 1999 through 2005, the authors
conclude that the use of litigation "as a tool to influence federal public land-
management agency decisions" is increasing, and that "EAJA creates a litigation
risk asymmetry that may cause stakeholders dissatisfied with U.S. Forest Service
land management decisions to embrace litigation." 459 They caution, however, that
there is "insufficient evidence to conclude that the EAJA is a driver for any
particular plaintiff to challenge any particular US Forest Service project."460 They
explain:
Decisions to litigate are likely driven by multiple factors and policymakers
should realize that EAJA reform might not eliminate or reduce US Forest Service
land-management litigation. For example, some organizations' raison d'8tre is to
initiate "public interest litigation." Even if EAJA were completely repealed, these
organizations would likely continue to sue land-management agencies. Also, some
national forest management decisions are so offensive to some stakeholders that
litigation is probably inevitable. 4 61
They also point out that many individuals and groups that sue the Forest
Service are one-time plaintiffs, and that "many organizations have found that
litigation provides an effective policy forum."462 Nonetheless, they conclude:
The original intent of the EAJA has drifted with its use in national forest
management litigation. In our study, most EAJA payments were made to
environmental interest groups with widely varying financial capabilities. We note
that many are quite well financed and therefore not the class of plaintiffs for which
the law was designed to provide access to the expensive federal litigation system.463
457. Cf GAO-I 1-650, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: CASES AGAINST EPA AND ASSOCIATED COSTS
OVER T[ME.,U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 366.
458. Mortimer & Malmsheimer, supra note 362.







Mortimer and Malmsheimer's study was limited to the U.S. Forest Service over
a period of six years, but their points are valid more broadly. It is hard to imagine
that a group like the Natural Resources Defense Council, worth hundreds of
millions of dollars,464 sues the government because EAJA recovery is available. For
many environmental groups, litigation is a way of life. Passing the GLSA might
increase the costs of litigation for these groups while decreasing the costs to the
government, but it is questionable whether that will be enough to reverse the tide of
litigation that is engulfing the government. And, of course, the newly mandated
EAJA tracking program will cost money as well.
Aside from this very significant concern, as far as it goes, the GLSA seems
prudently drafted. The application of the net worth cap to 501(c)(3) organizations,
in particular, will reduce the government's exposure in environmental and other
EAJA litigation. Limits on the number of awards per year will reduce copycat
lawsuits. The removal of exceptions to the statutory cap for "experts" will alleviate
the widespread flaunting of the Pierce rule that was discussed in Part 3.A, and
ensure that full-time environmental attorneys are on the same footing as attorneys in
private practice. The removal of compensation for pro bono work will reinforce the
traditional meaning of "pro bono." And of course, the reinstitution of tracking of
EAJA payments will provide necessary accountability that is currently missing
from EAJA. The history outlined in this article suggests additional measures, absent
from the current legislation, that might also be considered.
A substantial portion of Part 3.B was devoted to the 501(c)(3) exception, and
two of the major issues connected to the exception are problems with multiple
litigants, such as the difficulty of tracking the movement of funds between and
among them, and the availability of relatively cheap in-house counsel for
environmental groups. One way to address the multiple parties issue would be to
require that plaintiffs make disclosure of their corporate connections, presumably at
the same time they disclose their net worth. The idea would be to include in the net
worth of each litigant the net worth of all parent entities and wholly owned
subsidiaries, to prevent the use of smaller ephemeral or shell organizations to
circumvent the cap on net worth.465 Another possibility would be to require the
reduction of fees to the extent that sought-for fees represent duplicative work done
by multiple parties.466
The fact that environmental organizations often maintain (relatively) low cost
in-house counsel467 is more problematic. One measure that Congress should
consider would be to require that fees be denied to the extent that they represent
464. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
465. A similar system has been proposed for trade associations, where the net worth of an association's
members would be counted towards the net worth of the association. John W. Finley, III, Note, Unjust Access
to the Equal Access to Justice Act: A Proposal to Close the Act's Eligibility Loophole for Members of Trade
Associations, 53 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 243, 260 (1998). Finley characterizes this as "a single-
party variation on the mixed eligibility problem." Id. at 246.
466. Courts already do this to a certain extent. See, e.g., United States v. Prabhu, No. 2:04-cv-00589-RCJ-
LRL, 2007 WL 3119854 (D. Nev. Feb 25, 2008). Making this inquiry a statutory requirement can only help
matters.
467. See discussion supra Part 3.B.
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market rates over the actual cost of in-house counsel. This proposal calls into
question the traditional convention of relying on market rates, 468 but if Congress is
serious about reducing the cost of EAJA and making the law apply more fairly to
different types of plaintiffs, it is an idea worth considering. One necessary action
would be to legislatively abrogate Jean's application of Hensley v. Eckerhart to
EAJA cases.469 At present, the case stands for the principle that an award of
attorneys' fees to a lawyer working for a non-profit organization is never an
unjustified windfall. Such a rule flies in the face of both logic and the purpose of
EAJA, and it stands in the way of any serious effort at reform.
Altogether, the GLSA would appear to be a solid, if basic, piece of legislation.
Claims that it will harm veterans or Social Security claimants 470 appear to be
unfounded. Claims that it will tremendously relieve the burden on agencies seem
optimistic, but that is hardly a reason not to enact it. The GLSA reinstates necessary
tracking of EAJA awards, and also represents a valuable first step in reducing
excessive awards. Its changes follow the spirit and also the substance of many of
the historical ideas behind EAJA, outlined in Parts 1.C and 2.A of this article, and
also many past attempts at reform, outlined earlier in this Part. It could do more in
that vein, and obviously entirely different legislation would be needed to address
the problems with awards made under the Endangered Species Act and other
similar statutes. But these are not arguments against the GLSA; rather, they are
arguments for the GLSA and more.
CONCLUSION
The Equal Access to Justice Act is an "unusual form of fee-shifting statute," as
Judge Posner pithily put it, and some of its departures from the standard fee-shifting
template are "attributable to the Justice Department's reservations, shared by a
number of members of Congress, about forking over government money to people
litigating against the government." 471 But to describe it so is to short-change an
intricate and special piece of legislation. It is among the most wide-reaching
statutes in the U.S. Code, and what it attempts to do is as complex in execution as it
is simple in concept: to aid those who would otherwise be truly hurt by fighting the
government when it acts without justification. Balancing between giving money to
practically every litigant and not giving out enough money has always been a
difficult task for the application of EAJA, as funneling such monies to the right
litigants has also been.
But it is clear that EAJA is in need of reform, in two very different ways. One
needed reform, towards which overtures have been made several times in the past,
is in further refining small business and individuals' access to the Act, particularly
involving confrontations with EPA, OSHA, NLRB, and their like. Though no
468. See discussion supra Part 3.A.
469. See discussion supra Part 3.A.
470. E g. Fact Sheet: Reasons to Oppose the Government Litigation Savings Act, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE, brennan.3cdn.net/07bdabac735bf6ea95_c3m6b9n25.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
471. Matthews-Sheets v. Astrue, 653 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 2011).
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current legislation aims at this goal, it continues to be a worthwhile goal, and if not
implemented in discussion of the Government Litigation Savings Act of 2011, it
might well serve as a topic for future reforms.
The other needed reform looks to the abuses of EAJA chronicled in depth in
Part 3 above. Thus, there needs to be a reduction in cases where plaintiffs prevail on
process instead of substance; a reduction in the massive fees paid to 501(c)(3)
litigants; a reduction in how many cases a litigant can flood the system with and
still expect to recoup expenses; and a removal of the government's perverse
incentive to settle cases to avoid costs spiraling, which will hopefully mitigate the
danger posed by the Attorney General's settlement authority.
The GLSA handles these issues neatly. The inclusion of a standing requirement
for a "direct and personal interest" will greatly reduce the extent to which 501(c)(3)
organizations can intervene and assert their right to compensation. While they still
might be able to meet Article III standing requirements, and still might be able to
prevail on procedural issues, what the "direct and personal interest" language will
do is reinstate the natural economic drawback of litigation. Litigants will no longer
be able to slap the agency with an APA case for every minor procedural drawback:
they will have to ask themselves the hard question every time of whether it is worth
the legal expense to do so. The net worth cap, moreover, will remove the biggest of
these organizations from getting reimbursed in such largely meritless cases. The
hard cap on fees, now made "harder" by the GLSA, will also put a serious damper
on how much EAJA pays out in these cases, while retaining a reasonable fee for
most cases, including the overwhelming majority of EAJA users: Social Security
and Veterans' Claims claimants.
There are, of course, other steps that the GLSA might take that would make the
reform even more powerful: some of these steps were outlined in the end of Part
4.F. Nevertheless, it is unwise in the context of congressional legislation to let the
perfect become the enemy of the good, and the GLSA is clearly good legislation. It
is accountability-oriented and loophole-fixing: a classic, textbook example of
reform legislation, and so hopefully will soon be the latest addition to EAJA.
